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Economic Analysis of Labor Markets and Labor Law: 
An Institutional/Industrial Relations Perspective 
 
I. Introduction 
In the twentieth century two intellectual traditions were the most influential in the American field 
of labor economics. The first was the tradition of institutional economics (IE) and its close off-
shoot industrial relations (IR), the second was the tradition of neoclassical economics (NE). This 
cleavage is refracted into the modern field of labor law where on one side is an IEIR-oriented 
traditional approach to labor law (e.g., Deakin and Wilkinson 2005; Estlund 2006; Arthurs 2007) 
and, on the other, a largely NE-inspired law and economics (L&E) approach (Schwab 1997; 
Posner 2007; Medema 2010).     
The institutional economics/industrial relations (IEIR) approach had its original home 
base at the University of Wisconsin and was led by John Commons; after the 1930s it evolved 
and expanded to include a neo-institutional branch centered in industrial relations and headed by 
non-Wisconsin labor economists such as John Dunlop, Clark Kerr, Richard Lester, and Lloyd 
Reynolds (McNulty 1980; Segal 1986; Kaufman 1988, 2006). Johnson (1975) refers to this 
tradition as the “old labor economics” and notes that it was partially separated from the main 
body of economics by its cross-disciplinary approach to theory-building, critical stance toward 
the competitive core of neoclassical theory, and neutral-to-sympathetic attitude toward trade 
unions and labor law. Other intellectual traditions, such as socio-economics, economic 
sociology, and comparative institutional analysis from political science, also feed into modern 
day IEIR.  
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The cross-disciplinary dimension of original IEIR included considerable attention to the 
role of law as a determinant of an economy’s institutional infrastructure and economic 
performance, making it a central player in what Hovenkamp (1990; also Pearson 1997) identifies 
as the twentieth century’s first law and economics movement (FL&EM). The FL&EM was 
closely linked to the legal realist tradition in law (Mercuro and Medema 1997; Fried 1998); 
within the FL&EM the subfield of labor law occupied a central place, illustrated by Commons 
and Andrews’ pioneering text Principles of Labor Legislation (1916). After WWII many writers 
in traditional labor law field, as well as some of the nation’s best-known labor mediators, 
arbitrators and policy officials, came from the IEIR camp. Examples are Henry Aaron, Archibald 
Cox, John Dunlop, and Arthur Goldberg; outside the USA are people such as Otto Kahn-Freund 
and Rodger Blanpain. 
The neoclassical economics tradition in American labor economics goes back to the early 
20th century with principal roots in the work of English neoclassical economists, such as Alfred 
Marshall, John Hicks, and Joan Robinson; after World War II, however, NE research in labor 
economics shifted to America and soon acquired a well-recognized home base at another mid-
western university -- the University of Chicago (McNulty 1980; Boyer and Smith 2001; 
Kaufman 2010a). Illustratively, Chicago professor H. Gregg Lewis is widely considered the 
“father” of modern labor economics and one reviewer (Biddle 1996) labels his style of 
economics “uncompromising neoclassicism” (p. 184). The neoclassical approach to the study of 
labor economics was until the 1970s largely an application of Marshallian partial equilibrium 
price theory to labor markets and wage determination; since then, however, contributions by 
Gary Becker and several other Nobel prize winning economists at Chicago (and elsewhere) have 
greatly broadened its domain and explanatory power by applying the tools of rational choice and 
4 
 
equilibrium to an ever-widening range of non-market and imperfect market topics (Becker 1976, 
1993; Lazear 2000). The neoclassical approach in America was overshadowed by the IEIR 
paradigm through the 1950s and the events of the Great Depression and New Deal in the eyes of 
many economists appeared to considerably discredit and marginalize NE’s competitive 
“demand/supply” theoretical core. In hindsight, however, this was only a temporary setback and 
from the 1970s onward the “new” labor economics (aka, modern labor economics) of the NE 
school grew in strength and influence until by century’s end it had become so dominant across 
American universities that younger researchers could be forgiven for thinking no earlier IEIR 
approach had ever been mainstream (Pearson 1997; Boyer and Smith 2001; Cahuc and 
Zylberberg 2004).  
The University of Chicago was also home to what Hovenkamp (1990) refers to as the 
second law and economics movement (SL&EM). It was fathered by Chicagoans Ronald Coase 
and Richard Posner, is anchored (particularly the Posnerian version) in neoclassical price theory, 
and seeks at a positive level to analyze how law influences economic activity and at a normative 
level how law should be constructed in order to promote economic efficiency. For reasons 
explained shortly, Chicago L&E is wary-to-skeptical of government interference with private 
contracting and market outcomes (Schwab 1997; Medema 2010). The exemplar work is Posner’s 
The Economic Analysis of Law (2007). In the labor law field Posner’s article “Some Economic 
Aspects of Labor Law” (1984) was an early contribution, complemented by influential articles 
on subjects such as critique of the New Deal labor legislation and defense of employment-at-will 
by fellow Chicagoan Richard Epstein (e.g., Epstein 1983, 1984). In the last twenty-thirty years 
the Chicago-based law and economics (L&E) movement has grown rapidly and now has a 
presence in many economics departments and law schools; naturally, in this process it has 
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evolved beyond its Chicago and NE price theory roots but with many continuing linkages thereto 
in terms of theoretical and policy orientation (Medema and Mercuro 1997).  
 This chapter compares and contrasts the theoretical foundations of the first and second 
L&E movements, the former located in IEIR and the second in NE, and the respective 
implications these theories have for analysis and evaluation of labor law. The chapter then 
demonstrates why, from an IEIR perceptive, the NE model used in SL&EM has serious logical 
flaws and leads to unduly negative conclusions about the potential of labor law to enhance social 
welfare.  
Before proceeding, several points of context are usefully established. First, IEIR and NE 
are not monolithic constructs and, as indicated above, NE now covers a very heterogeneous 
territory and, indeed, has expanded via a Coasian-inspired new institutional economics (NIE) to 
include a comparative study of institutions (Williamson 1985; Furubotn and Richter 2005). 
Hence, I define and use the two terms in the following delimited sense: IEIR typifies the people 
and ideas associated with the FL&EM and NE similarly typifies people and ideas associated with 
the SL&EM. Also, IEIR and NE are not the endpoints in the spectrum of labor market theory for 
other intellectual traditions occupy these positions, such as Marxist/radical and post-Keynesian 
labor economics to the left of IEIR and Austrian (libertarian) economics to the right of NE. Also, 
as used in this chapter “Wisconsin” and “Chicago” are best regarded as metaphors or allegorical 
symbols for two broader constructs, IEIR and FL&EM on one hand and NE and SL&EM on the 
other, that now extend far beyond their original home bases. The qualifier “in the USA” is also 
important since the IEIR and NE traditions discussed here, along with their parallel labor law 
traditions, are in a number of respects distinctively American products (Jacoby 2005). Finally, 
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the term “labor law” is used in the expansive sense of covering collective and individual 
dimensions, the latter sometimes separately distinguished as employment law.  
The reader may also wish to consult an earlier review by this author of the first and 
second L&E movements (Kaufman 2009) as this chapter builds and expands on it.   
 
II. The Fundamental Dividing Line: “Assume a Competitive Labor Market” 
Modern economics, as indicated above, theorizes an immense range of institutions and 
behaviors, many of which do not even involve a market per se. When it comes to evaluation of 
labor law, however, people in NE and SL&EM typically start the analysis from the same 
foundational concept, a concept I paraphrase as “assume a competitive labor market.” This often 
takes the pure form of a perfectly competitive labor market, with attendant demand/supply (DS) 
diagram; other times frictions and imperfections are introduced, such as in the NIE, but with the 
common assumption that competitive selection pressures remain strong enough that employers 
and employees are led to adopt (mostly) efficient contract terms. In the words of Nobel laureate 
Robert Solow (1990: xvi), “in today’s preferred style the labor market is usually modeled as just 
clearing or, more subtly, producing efficient contracts.” Thus, economists use the terms 
“competitive market” and “competitive theory” in both a narrow (zero friction) and broad 
(positive friction) sense. By conventional agreement, however, the core property that any such 
model must preserve in order to remain “competitive” is prices (including wage rates) are 
parametric (a “given”) and therefore individual firms and workers are price-takers and have no 
ability to set an alternative price and still find willing buyers and sellers (Varian 2010: 603).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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 Figure 1 illustrates the competitive DS labor market model; it is an application to the 
labor market of the generic competitive market model that is a ubiquitous feature of scholarly 
expositions of modern L&E (e.g., Mercuro and Medema 1997; Posner 2007; Cooter and Ulen 
2010). The labor demand curve D and supply curve S determine an equilibrium wage W and 
employment level L. This conclusion by itself is not of great significance for analysis of labor 
law; what matters are the implications for social welfare.  
One desirable social welfare property, mentioned in the Solow quote, is that competitive 
markets yield market-clearing prices and quantities. This means that competition causes wage 
rates to rise or fall until equilibrium is established where demand and supply are evenly balanced 
and neither a shortage nor excess of labor prevails. The beneficial aspect of market clearing is 
most apparent at the aggregate level; that is, the implication is that a competitive market 
economy automatically and without government guidance (“as if by an invisible hand”) tends to 
correct demand/supply imbalances and yield an equilibrium where the number of jobs available 
matches the number of people wanting to work (a definition of full employment).  
A second desirable property, also alluded to in the Solow quotation, is that a competitive 
market economy leads to an efficient use of resources. Full employment of labor is clearly one 
dimension of efficiency (unemployment is a waste of labor resources). Another dimension is that 
competition and competitive wage rates sort and assign the nation’s heterogeneous labor 
resources to their most productive use (e.g., the people with a comparative advantage at 
plumbing end up being plumbers). Yet a third dimension is that competition prevents employers 
from exploiting (underpaying) workers and provides employers with strong incentives to treat 
workers fairly (e.g., ill-treatment leads to a high turnover rate, a reputation as a bad employer, 
and less loyal and committed employees). A final dimension of efficiency, known as Pareto 
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optimality, is that the nation’s resources are allocated and utilized with no slack or waste; that is, 
the production of goods and services (or “wealth”) is at the economy’s maximum limit and one 
person therefore can get more goods and services only if another gets less.  
The DS model and the conditions and implications that come from it are, of course, 
highly idealized; further, as described in more detail below economists in the NE/NIE tradition 
have persuasively argued that many seeming labor market problems (e.g., unemployment, gender 
wage differentials) are actually efficient or competitive-like responses to underlying 
productivity, cost, and taste differentials. Not all economists, however, accept either the standard 
competitive model or the extended NE/NIE efficient contract version as useful interpretations of 
labor markets; others use them only as rough and ready benchmarks to get the analysis started. 
Hence a wide spectrum of opinion exists among economists regarding two related questions. The 
first is how well the competitive model and its various extensions and generalizations serve as a 
useful device for understanding and explaining labor markets and employment relationships; the 
second is to what degree the outcomes of a competitive labor market, even if attained, are 
beneficial for human welfare and therefore a desired object of public policy.  
Here is located, I believe, a central dividing line between FL&EM and SL&EM. As a 
general statement (documented in what follows), the position of people affiliated with the first 
L&E movement answer a mostly “no” to both of these questions while those with the second 
L&E answer a mostly “yes.” For this reason Rodrik (2007; also McCloskey 1997) calls those in 
the SL&EM group “first best” economists (market generated outcomes are typically the best that 
are realistically attainable) and those in the FL&EM group “second best” (market generated 
outcomes can be improved upon through government regulation/coordination). Given this 
position, first best economists believe it is appropriate to start off analysis of labor law with the 
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proposition “assume a competitive labor market;” second best economists, however, believe that 
the “assume a competitive labor market” proposition is by itself likely to lead to significant error 
in evaluating the pros and cons of labor law and must, therefore, either be used with significant 
qualifications or replaced with a different model.  
 
III. The Competitive Labor Market Model in the Second L&E Movement 
 
In this section I take a deeper look at the role and significance of the “assume a competitive labor 
market” theme in the second L&E movement -- where “competitive” is defined broadly to 
include efficient contract generalizations.  
The effective birth date of both IEIR and NE is the 1880s (Blaug 1985; Hovenkamp 
1990; Jacoby 2005). The marginal revolution had begun in the 1870s in the work of Jevons, 
Menger and Walras and by the 1880s had mostly displaced the classical approach of Malthus, 
Ricardo, and Marx. Not unrelatedly, this decade also saw the emergence of the Methodenstreit 
(i.e., “battle over method”) – a fierce debate between over the pros and cons of two rival 
approaches to the science of economics (Rima 2009). On one side were the proponents of 
classical/neoclassical economics, principally located in Britain, Austria and to some degree 
France; on the other were proponents of historical/social economics (HSE), located principally in 
Germany but with strong presence in heterodox circles in Britain and other countries (Koot 1987; 
Pearson 1997). The HSE proponents were the insurgents and they sought to substantially modify 
the orthodox economics developed by Ricardo, Mill and Walras; considerably to their left were 
various Marxists and radicals but they sought to replace orthodoxy and thus fall outside our 
purview.  
10 
 
The battle was ostensibly over the merits of a deductive versus inductive approach to 
theory-building in economics; under the surface, however, were also political considerations 
about individualism vs. collectivism and the extent of government regulation and redistribution 
(Ekelund and Hebert 2007: Chs. 9, 10). The main body of English deductive economists, for 
example, placed tight limits on government regulation of labor (some opposed maximum hour 
limits for women and children) while most HSE economists supported Germany’s pioneering 
program of workmen’s compensation, unemployment insurance, and old age pensions. The 
deductive approach was favored by the classical/neoclassical side, exemplified in the abstract 
and mathematical theories of Ricardo and Walras, respectively. This approach to theorizing 
relied on a few general propositions about human nature and markets – typically portrayed as 
self-evident and akin to laws of nature (e.g., the “economic man” model of rational and self-
interested behavior; the law of supply and demand) – and proceeded to derive a corpus of cause-
effect propositions. The spirit is well captured by Walras (1954 [1900]) who declares,  
“In fact, the whole world may be looked upon as a vast general market made up of 
diverse special markets. Our task then is to discover the laws to which these purchases 
and sales tend to conform automatically. To this end, we shall suppose that the market is 
perfectly competitive, just as in pure mechanics we suppose, to start with, that machines 
are perfectly frictionless” (p. 84).    
   
This quote highlights several features of the early neoclassical approach that have 
remained prominent over the decades and still inform the core of neoclassical microeconomics as 
taught to today’s students and used in neoclassical-oriented treatises on law and economics 
(Rizvi 2007); indeed, it is from these historical roots that the “assume a competitive labor 
market” proposition originates. These features include a conceptual model of the economy 
derived from physics and classical mechanics where economic relations are closely akin to 
natural laws (e.g., the “law of demand”); a core model of human beings based on rationality and 
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self-interest; a core model of markets based on demand and supply and competitive equilibrium; 
a core set of tools including constrained maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency;  and 
adherence to the ideas of Adam Smith and Jean Baptiste Say – enshrined in the Invisible Hand 
idea and Say’s Law -- that self-interest and competition cause a market economy to 
automatically gravitate through flexible price adjustments toward a full-employment equilibrium 
(Kates 1998). These ideas are then rounded-out with the Pareto welfare principle, described 
earlier.  
These insights were formalized in the 1950s by Arrow and Debreu into the first welfare 
theorem (FWT) of neoclassical economics (Blaug 2007). The FWT is also often called the 
“invisible hand” theorem. It states that a perfectly competitive economy is able to generate a 
Pareto optimal (aka, efficient) allocation of resources, meaning that the flexible price system puts 
the economy on its production possibility frontier (full utilization of resources, including labor) 
such that all gains from trade are exhausted and no readjustment of production/distribution can 
make one person better off without harming the welfare of another. Another characterization of 
Pareto optimality is “best feasible outcome,” given the initial distribution of wealth and existing 
set of rules, laws, and other constraints. The FWT is often regarded as the most important result 
of economic science, per this statement by Just, Hueth and Schmitz (2004): 
“This conclusion [the first welfare theorem] is probably the single most powerful result in 
the theory of market economies and is widely used by economists who believe that 
markets are competitive and that governments should not intervene in economic activity. 
Milton Friedman and the ‘Chicago School’ are the best known defenders of this position. 
In addition, because of its efficiency properties, competitive equilibrium offers a useful 
standard for policy analysis” (pp. 27-28).    
 
Not surprisingly, the FWT leads to distinctly conservative-to-libertarian conclusions 
regarding policy and institutional interventions in labor markets. Illustratively, Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green (1995) state, “Under perfectly competitive conditions….the only possible 
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welfare justification for intervention in the economy is the fulfillment of distributional 
objectives” (p. 524). With regard to the last part of this statement (distribution), they go on to 
discuss that one implication of the second welfare theorem (SWT) is that any desired 
redistribution for equity and fairness reasons should be done “before the market” in the form of 
ex ante lump sum taxes and payments rather than through use of methods that in some way 
interfere with demand/supply (e.g., a minimum wage law, collective bargaining) or endeavor to 
alter market outcomes ex post. [The SWT states that attainment of efficiency in a competitive 
market system is independent of the distribution of income and other endowments, implying that 
a well-chosen change in endowments and rules before trading starts will lead to outcomes that 
create the desired income distribution while leaving the market free to achieve these outcomes 
efficiently via DS.] Thus, the FWT and SWT effectively establish the prima facie case that in a 
competitive market economy the appropriate role of government is limited to certain basic 
functions such as maintenance of law and order, enforcement of contracts, provision of public 
goods, and lump-sum income transfers; otherwise, markets and employers and employees are 
best left to operate on their own with laissez-faire the general but not necessarily universal rule. 
As the quote above indicates, this position is particularly associated with the Chicago School of 
economics and many of the Chicagoans who founded and participated in the development of 
modern law and economics (Overfeldt 2007; Freedman 2008; Medema 2010).  
 One rarely sees the FWT and SWT mentioned in the labor economics literature or even 
in most NE discussions of labor law and policy. A reason is that NE-style labor economics is 
essentially applied microeconomics and the FWT and SWT are therefore typically presumed or 
implicit.  Illustrative is the recent book The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets (Boeri and 
van Ours 2008). In Chapter 1 they follow the standard theoretical line of argument in NE and 
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SL&EM: they state that the theoretical model economists use as the benchmark for evaluating 
labor market institutions and laws is the competitive DS model. They then lay out this model and 
demonstrate (1) why competition maximizes allocative efficiency and (2) how laws and 
institutions (e.g., unions) interfere with DS and create welfare losses. Without invoking the FWT 
and SWT in name, they nonetheless reach a minimalist verdict on the appropriate role of labor 
law and institutions. In their words,   
“Because all labor market institutions introduce a wedge between labor demand and 
supply, they reduce the size of labor markets [and gains from trade]. If the labor market is 
competitive, the total surplus to be shared between firms and workers will be reduced 
after the introduction of any labor market institution….it should be possible to make 
everybody happier (or at least as happy) without them” (p. 18). 
  
These pro-market conclusions rest, of course, on the supposition that real world labor 
markets are indeed approximately competitive or, more generally, that the outcomes are efficient 
as if the market were competitive. Reder (1982) claims the early Chicago economists who 
founded the SL&EM took precisely this view. He states that their position was, “…. in the 
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, one may treat observed prices and quantities as 
good approximations to their long-run competitive equilibrium values” (p. 12). The implication 
is that labor markets, while having a variety of short-run frictions and imperfections, nonetheless 
yield outcomes that in the longer run are approximately competitive. An implication is that most 
alleged employment problems, such as discrimination, exploitation, and bad treatment, are of a 
surface or transitory nature that will get ironed-out by competition without government 
intervention (Friedman and Friedman 1990).   
In the last two-to-three decades many economists with the SL&EM have moved to a 
more generalized version of this proposition, particularly due to the influence of Coase and the 
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NIE.  Coase (1937) and later writers such as Williamson (1985) point out that a significant share 
of economic exchange takes place inside firms where there is no competitive market and 
management (in the absence of a union) decides employment matters by fiat. What, then, is to 
prevent managers from taking advantage of workers?  
NE/NIE admits that sometimes workers are taken advantage of but denies that in most 
cases this is a widespread problem (Dow 1997). The line of argument proceeds along two levels. 
The first invokes the Coase theorem, an idea inspired by Coase (1960) but named and formally 
articulated by Stigler (1966). The theorem asserts that in a situation of zero transaction cost 
(frictionless/zero-cost trading) individual economic agents have an incentive to exchange 
property rights to scarce resources until they are fully allocated to the people who value them 
most. The key insights SL&EM proponents take from the Coase theorem are (1) with low 
transaction costs individuals can bargain and trade their way to a competitive-like and surplus-
maximizing outcome even in the absence of markets, and (2) where employment problems occur 
government regulation or labor unions are not the only or necessarily best option; rather, an 
alternative is to make existing markets more competitive by reducing transaction costs and 
creating new or better-protected property rights (Cooter and Ulen 2010).    
The second line of thought also comes from Coase (1937) and the NIE. The argument is 
that firms, employment relationships, and internal labor markets come into existence in order to 
economize on the costs of allocating and coordinating resources through direct exchange in labor 
markets. That is, using managers to coordinate and allocate labor (employees) inside firms can 
be the more efficient solution when transaction costs of market exchange are relatively high. 
Since ILMs are coordinated by management and not demand/supply, one might think that 
considerable room therefore opens up for discrimination, exploitation and other maladies. 
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However, these economists argue that competition in external labor and product markets in most 
cases effectively regulates and polices the practices and conditions of labor inside firms. They 
cite three reasons. The first is that workers can quit if they do not get market-going pay and 
conditions; a second is that firms lose profit if they do not adopt efficient employment structures 
and practices; and, third, even though explicit market prices do not exist in ILMs the managers 
and workers have substitute “shadow prices” (opportunity costs) to guide them toward outcomes 
that are surplus maximizing. Illustratively, Wachter and Wright (1990) argue that “ELM 
economic pressures on the ILM are not repealed; they are simply rechanneled…” (p. 244) and, 
hence, employers and employees are led to adopt efficient and self-enforcing contract practices 
and understandings that “serve the optimizing goals of the firm and the workers” (p. 242) and 
“promot[e] the joint surplus through savings on contract costs” (p. 256).  
 The point to be stressed is that the NE paradigm, either in terms of standard competitive 
price theory or a transaction cost efficient contract theory, does not rule out use of labor law per 
se; rather, it creates a general presumption against interference. This position rests on other 
propositions that are implicit in the first welfare theorem and a mainstay of SL&EM analysis —
the benefits of free trade and legal corollary of freedom of contract  in competitive markets. The 
virtues of free trade and freedom of contract are that all sides gain from trade and resources flow 
to the contracting party who values them most (the core idea of the Coase theorem). Based on 
this reasoning, Frank Knight of the Chicago School comments, “All good economists since 
Smith have favored free trade, that is, laissez-faire against protectionism” (Emmett 1999: 439). 
From this perspective, the danger with labor law – and certainly with unions – is that despite 
their well-intentioned goals they often create undesirable protectionism and monopoly in labor 
markets. The free trade sentiment among NE economists is also captured in these comments by 
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Charles Plott (2010). He states (p. 14), “[A] consensus [exists] within the scientific community 
that is spreading to the general public that free markets….are in everyone’s best interest.” He 
immediately cautions that “The principle [of free markets] does not say that government should 
do nothing” (p. 14) but also concludes in the next sentence that in free markets “there are natural 
tendencies and that the most productive policies are those that will harmonize with them.” These 
“harmonizing policies” are not zero regulation but regulation only when clearly needed, per his 
observation that “Our economy is built on the idea that competition can protect the consuming 
public” (p. 8). Members of SL&EM would amend this statement only by expanding it to include  
the working public.  
Hence, mainstream economists start-off analysis of labor law from the presumption that 
free trade in labor is desired; therefore, to make the case for an abridgement of free trade one 
must demonstrate clear evidence that markets for some reason are malfunctioning. That is, one 
must demonstrate market failure (Addison and Hirsch 1997; Boeri and van Ours 2008).  A 
market failure, traditionally defined, arises when some feature of labor markets diverges in a 
substantively important way from the ideal of perfect competition. Oft-cited examples are 
monopsony, imperfect/asymmetric information, externalities, public goods, principal-agent 
problems, match-specific investments, and barriers to mobility. However, the extended efficient 
contract form of NE, as described above, has been able to demonstrate that many of these 
(alleged) departures from competition are not likely to pose significant social concern. One 
reason is that they often reflect an efficient adaptation to underlying technological and cost 
constraints (Dow 1997). For example, low turnover may not mean a firm has monopsony power 
but, rather, that workers choose to stay with the employer to reap the benefits of specific on-the-
job training. Likewise, if women are mostly employed in a group of low-paying occupations 
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while men are mostly employed in different group of high-paying occupations this is not 
necessarily a sign of discrimination but instead efficient sorting by comparative advantage (due 
to different biological endowments and gender-related tastes) and differences in human capital 
investment (due to different occupational choices and family roles). A second reason is that 
employers and employees are often able to create self-enforcing contract provisions and 
safeguards that protect themselves from potential opportunism and exploitation on account of 
these non-competitive elements. For example, match-specific investments (e.g., firm-specific job 
skills and training) create sunk costs for both the firm and worker and the two sides are therefore 
restrained from opportunistically taking advantage of each other by the prospect of losing these 
costs if the relationship ends. Wachter (2004) points out these contract safeguards are not always 
fully effective and are necessarily a second-best solution relative to a world of perfect 
competition, yet broadly viewed they are often first-best solutions in light of prevailing costs and 
constraints. He states: 
“However, second-best solutions are not necessarily market failures that give rise to 
policy improvements. Information asymmetries, potential opportunism, and moral hazard 
are real economic costs just like any other economic cost, such as workers’ insistence on 
being paid to work. Consequently, the self-enforcing arrangements worked out by the 
parties are arguably first-best, given the restricted set of solutions available to them” (p. 
169-70).    
 
It is a fair generalization to say that economists associated with the SL&EM are for these 
reasons predisposed to regard labor markets – absent compelling evidence to the contrary -- as 
approximately competitive and employment contracts as generally efficient (Mercuro and 
Medema 1997; Schwab 1997; Huang 2009). This leads them, in turn, to favor maximum scope 
for free markets, competition and private ordering in firms and, conversely, to take a skeptical 
“first show me the market failure” argument toward proposed extensions of labor law, 
government regulation, or trade unions and collective bargaining. Their minimalist view on labor 
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law is then reinforced by practical considerations. That is, in an ideal world government 
regulation could potentially pinpoint instances of workplace exploitation or discrimination and 
fashion cost-effective remedies; in the real world, however, government regulation is slow, 
cumbersome and politically driven and therefore can entail very large costs for fixing a social 
problem. Society, therefore, may find that the costs from intervening in markets far outweighs 
the benefits.   
 
IV. A Case Study: Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law 
Exhibit A of the general approach I am describing is Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law 
(2007); the approach there is, in turn, mirrored in practically every other book and journal article 
with “law and economics” in the title. My purpose is to illustrate in a concrete way (1) reliance 
of the second L&E movement on the competitive model and (2) the marked tendency of the 
model to yield “guilty until proven innocent” conclusions about labor law.  
The title of Chapter 1 is “The Nature of Economic Reasoning.” The first sentence reads, 
“This book is written in the conviction that economics is a powerful tool for analyzing a vast 
range of legal questions…” (p. 3). I highlight this sentence because it suggests that economics is 
a singular entity, mirroring the mainstream presumption à la Becker that there is only one corpus 
of economic theory (Becker is cited in footnote 1.1). The next sentence reads, “A student takes a 
course in price theory….” Price theory is another term for standard NE microeconomic theory, 
suggesting that while mainstream economics may indeed encompass a huge domain of non-
standard topics that the core remains the same price theory that earlier Chicagoans, such as 
Friedman and Stigler, popularized in a half century ago. The new L&E innovation, however, is 
to treat legal rules as establishing another vector of prices facing economic agents. 
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At the end of the first paragraph follows a new heading, labeled “Fundamental 
Concepts.” The first fundamental concept is “man is a rational utility maximizer” (p. 4). From 
this flows what Posner (p. 4) calls the “three fundamental principles of economics.” The first is 
the law of demand (price and quantity are inversely related); the second is the economic meaning 
of cost (often measured by a market price but more generally by the economic value of resources 
devoted to an alternative use, called opportunity cost or shadow price); the third is that resources 
tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if voluntary exchange and market trading are 
allowed (markets tend to promote efficient outcomes).  
These concepts are supplemented with three fundamental NE tools: the law of demand, 
illustrated by a downward sloping demand curve (Figure 1, p. 4); a competitive DS model of 
markets (Figure 2, p. 8); and the welfare criteria of Pareto superiority and the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation principle. The next-to-ending section of Chapter 1 is devoted to “The Realism of 
Assumptions in Economics.” Posner here follows Friedman (1953) and argues that the 
neoclassical theories and tools he uses are not to be judged by whether they are realistic 
(characterized as a demand on the part of critics for “descriptiveness completeness” (p. 16)) but 
by their predictive power. People have cognitive limitations (bounded rationality) and cannot as 
a factual matter make all the calculations competitive theory presumes; nonetheless, observed 
market outcomes typically approximate competitive predictions and therefore analysts may use 
the model “as if” it is a description of reality.  
Posner only briefly examines the effect of government regulation on markets in Chapter 
1. The specific example chosen -- rent control in a competitive housing market – illustrates the 
general points that regulation is frequently demanded by special interest groups as a form of rent-
seeking behavior, often has undesirable market consequences (shortages, higher prices, etc.), and 
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entails an overall reduction in social welfare through resource misallocation and deadwight loss. 
Chapter 11 is devoted entirely to regulation of the employment relationship. Posner considers a 
number of staple topics in labor law: unions, employment-at-will, minimum wages, occupational 
safety and health, mandated benefits, discrimination, and pensions. Space precludes a detailed 
review of this chapter; I thus summarize below salient points, roughly following the order in the 
book. 
• Labor markets are broadly competitive in nature since “labor monopsony…. is not a 
serious problem in this country” (p. 342) and “monopolies and cartels carry within 
them the seeds of their own destruction” (p. 343). Even where competition is not fully 
effective due to imperfect information or other frictions, one can nonetheless presume 
that labor outcomes are (mostly) efficient because otherwise unexploited gains from 
trade “would be negotiated voluntarily” (p. 349). The base-line for analysis, therefore, 
is “an efficient common law of labor relations” (p. 341).  
• Unions act as a labor cartel and win higher wages for their members but at the cost of 
economic inefficiency and “reduction in the demand for labor caused by union wage 
scales” (p. 343). The National Labor Relations Act “is a kind of reverse Sherman Act, 
designed to encourage cartelization of labor markets” (p. 344). 
• Workers were not victimized by early 20th century “yellow-dog contracts” (a 
provision that says a worker agrees as a condition of employment to refrain from 
joining a labor union) because in a competitive labor market “the worker presumably 
would demand compensation for giving up his right to join a union” (p. 341).   
• “Further evidence that job security is inefficient is that ….employment-at-will is the 
normal form of work contract in the United States. The worker can quit when he 
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wants… An employer who gets a reputation for arbitrarily discharging employees 
will have to pay new employees a premium…” (p. 348). 
• A legal minimum wage “reinforces the effect of unionization on wage rates” (p. 352) 
and thus represents another form of monopoly influence in labor markets; it also is 
ineffective in poverty reduction and most harms the job prospects of  the workers who 
are most disadvantaged (e.g., black teenagers).  
• “The Occupational Safety and Health Act …. is arguably superfluous. The employer 
has a selfish interest in providing the optimal…. level of worker health and safety” (p. 
354). 
• Women’s lower wages relative to men are mostly due to their different human capital 
and occupational choice decisions, made in light of different family roles and 
preferences. These differences “would have narrowed even without government 
intervention” and “not all employment discrimination on grounds of sex is 
inefficient.” (p. 357).  
• Pension protection may well not be necessary because (in part) “[t]he employer’s 
incentive to abuse the power that incomplete vesting conferred on him by reneging on 
his unwritten contract to deal fairly with his employees would be held in check by his 
concern for preserving a reputation for fair dealing” (p. 363-64).  
 
I cite these examples from Posner’s book to give concrete representation to what I am 
here calling the NE paradigm in the analysis of labor law and to its various properties and 
characteristics. One may also consult labor economists such as Boeri and van Oerts (2008) and 
legal scholars such as Jolls (2006) to see the same model and mode of reasoning in action. I 
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believe it is clear that “assume a competitive labor market” is the starting point for this type of 
economic analysis of law and that the structure and operationalization of this theory -- either in 
perfectly competitive or extended “demand/supply with frictions” form – by its very nature leads 
to a guilty until proven innocent verdict on labor law. The entire point of this chapter, in turn, is 
to question whether this a priori negative-leaning verdict on labor law rests on solid and evenly-
balanced theoretical ground.  
 
V. The Competitive Model in the First L&E Movement 
 
IEIR economists do not deny “demand and supply;” further, they recognize that competition is 
often a beneficial force that protects and advances the conditions of labor and incents firms to 
efficiently produce goods and services for consumers. These are part of the success story of 
capitalism. However, IEIR economists also claim that there is a darker side to labor markets in 
capitalism that NE and the SL&EM neglect, assume away, or fatalistically attribute to inexorable 
economic law. Craypo (1997) captures the IEIR viewpoint and critique of NE, for example, 
when he states,  
“Institutional labor economics in America appeared before the turn of the century in 
response to neoclassical failure to study labor markets rather than labor theories and 
therefore to address chronic unemployment and low wages among hourly workers….. At 
the heart of the institutional perception…. is the conviction that society gets the labor 
market outcomes it wants, not those determined by some economic law, and that society 
therefore must assume a responsibly interventionist position.” (p. 231).  
 
The term the early institutional economists gave to the darker side of the world of work is 
“labor problems” (also called “evils”) and many of the labor textbooks written by IEIR 
economists through the 1960s had the term “labor problems” somewhere in the title (e.g., 
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Watkins 1922; Shultz and Coleman 1961). Commonly cited labor problems were poverty-level 
wages, long work hours, industrial accidents, child labor, and unemployment; the package of 
“visible hand” measures to solve these problems included labor law, collective bargaining, social 
safety net insurance programs, and counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies (Kaufman 1997, 
2003a). As the old-style IEIR labor economics was replaced by new-style NE labor economics 
the term “labor problems” faded from sight and is today never encountered in the NE/SLEM 
literature. One may fairly speculate that part of the explanation is that the concept of labor 
problems carries a connotation of sub-optimality which goes against the maximization 
hypothesis central to NE/NIE theories; arguably another explanation is that the concept of labor 
problems provided IEIR economists with a rationale for government intervention in labor 
markets which NE/SL&EM writers typically regard as unpersuasive and counter-productive.  
The position of institutional economics and IEIR is that a laissez-faire or “state of nature” 
capitalist economy, such as in the early twentieth century United States, is certain to be 
unbalanced, unstable and inhumane and therefore conducive of considerable inefficiency, 
injustice and social conflict (Commons and Andrews 1916; Rutherford 2001; Budd 2004; Isaac 
2007; Kaufman 2010b). The purpose of FL&EM, accordingly, is to discover and implement 
labor law and the other policy measures in a manner that promotes greater balance, stability and 
social harmony. This does not mean IEIR economists have in mind a one-way street of ever-
greater regulation of labor markets; it does mean, however, that they think much of the labor 
legislation and regulation enacted over the twentieth century was on balance a good idea and has 
well-served the nation and, correlatively, it would be a mistake to dismantle large parts of it as 
counseled by the neoliberal and “first best” part of NE and SL&EM (Osterman, Kochan, Locke 
and Piore 2001; Kochan 2005; Befort and Budd 2009).  
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The difference of opinion between FL&EM and SL&EM revolves around different 
assessments of the benefits and costs of labor law, unions, and other such measures (compare 
Freeman and Medoff 1984 vs. Epstein, 1983; Craypo 1997 vs. Dow 1997; Kaufman 2010c vs. 
Neumark and Wascher 2008). NE and SL&M see few if any benefits because they look at labor 
markets as highly competitive, put considerable faith in the invisible hand, and judge 
performance mostly (or solely) by the criterion of economic efficiency (Lazear 2000); on the 
other hand, they see large costs in the form of fewer jobs, less competitive industry, higher 
consumer prices, a larger government bureaucracy, and a less efficient allocation of resources. 
IEIR, on the other hand, looks at labor law and associated employment programs and sees 
greater benefits and lower costs (e.g., Belman and Belzer 1997; Block, Roberts, and Clark 2003; 
Arthurs 2006; Traynor and Dau-Schmidt 2009; Estlund 2010). On the benefit side are six factors 
unduly discounted or neglected in NE:  
• Frictions, impediments and market failures are inherent to and widespread in labor 
markets and, therefore, invisible hand forces are present but attenuated and unable to 
fully protect and advance the interests of labor.  
• Labor markets and employment relationships are (in general) a tipped playing field 
favoring employers’ (and consumers’) interests over workers’ because of built-in 
social, legal and economic inequalities; hence, employment outcomes may be 
“competitive” but also considerably unequal, inefficient, and socially undesirable.  
• Competition in labor markets, more so that in product markets, can become excessive 
and actually retard rather than promote efficiency and industrial performance.  
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• Firms often have market power to set wages and this opens up space for non-
competitive outcomes in employment relationships that may contain a significant 
element of discrimination, exploitation, or unfairness.  
• Institutions in labor markets are not well-viewed as primarily inefficient wedges and 
distortions; rather, they are also essential to a high performing employment 
relationship because they promote higher static and dynamic efficiency through 
encouragement of  cooperation and trust, organizational citizenship and loyalty, 
security of investment in training and hard work, and voice and involvement in 
problem-solving.  
• Efficiency is important in evaluating employment outcomes but so are human rights 
for workers, democracy in the workplace, respect and fair treatment by employers, 
and jobs that are safe, satisfying and meaningful.  
 
IEIR economists also believe the costs of labor law are not as large or serious as NE 
portrays. For example,  
• Job losses are smaller (or not at all) for a moderate increase in labor costs from new 
or expanded employment law and regulation, in part because labor demand curves are 
more inelastic and “looser” due to non-NE features such as production indivisibilities 
and interdependencies (e.g., team forms of production; positive wage/effort effects). 
•  Labor law and regulation are often “distortion-correcting” rather than “distortion-
creating” so at least over a range the efficiency costs of labor law emphasized in NE 
are minimal or non-existent.  
26 
 
• Labor markets and firms frequently have resource slack and organizational buffers 
that can help absorb the cost effect of labor law.  
• Unfairness, exclusion, and ill-treatment in employment procedures and outcomes 
generate many economic and social costs that NE omits or under-emphasizes (e.g., 
greater absenteeism, less work effort, more strikes, waste of human resources) and 
which labor law can help reduce.  
• Government law and regulation can be administered more efficiently that NE portrays 
and, similarly, government leaders/workers are not just self-interested rent-seekers. 
 
 The FL&EM has its roots in the 1880s and was much inspired by the HSE type of 
economics done in late nineteenth century Germany (Hovenkamp 1990; Pearson; 1997; Jacoby 
2005); in the labor area it was also closely linked with  the creation of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) at the end of World War I (Kaufman 2004). The beginnings of 
industrialization brought with it numerous employment problems, mounting strikes and capital-
labor conflict, and the rise of radical trade unions and socialist political parties. These individual 
problems became known collectively as “The Labor Problem.” The economists and fellow social 
reformers who started the FL&EM believed that the Labor Problem, if allowed to fester and 
intensify, threatened the survival of American capitalism and democratic form of government 
(Fried 1998). They sought to defuse it by a middle-way program of reform that steered a course 
between laissez-faire on one side and socialism on the other.  
Two economists are the fathers of FL&EM, Richard Ely and Henry Carter Adams. Both 
did graduate work in Germany in the 1880s and wrote on the intersection of law and economics, 
particularly with regard to contracts and property rights (Rader 1966; Dorfman1969). Just as 
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Walras (earlier quoted) enunciated certain themes that capture the essence of NE, Adams and Ely 
do the same for IEIR. I start with Adams.  
Adams’ presidential address to the American Economic Association is titled “Economics 
and Jurisprudence” (1897). Adams states that law is “the background of all associated activity; it 
provides the framework that limits and controls the exercise of liberty…. [and is] the expression 
of the ethical sense of a community crystallized about the problem of common living” (p. 138). 
The fundamental objective of law is to “understand justice,….explain the evolution of justice,…. 
and formulate those rules of conduct essential to the realization of justice.” (ibid.). Adams 
emphasizes justice as the chief goal of law because justice is a prerequisite for a stable and 
harmonious social order and such an order is, in turn, a prerequisite for a prosperous economy.  
The major domestic problem Adams addresses in his paper is the Labor Problem. He 
says, “the workings of self-interest in the industrial field do not in all respects appear to be in 
harmony with the ideals of justice, and ….. it places in jeopardy material progress itself” (pp. 
142-43). His diagnosis for the growing disharmony in society is that the structure of relations 
between employers and employees shifted in ways that considerably tipped the labor contract in 
favor of employers (e.g., the growth of labor corporations, a wage labor force dependent on 
employers for jobs and the means of production; substantial unemployment in labor markets); 
this growing inequality -- and the insecure and frequently oppressive employment experiences 
that accompanied it -- created a growing sense of individual and class injustice; and the solution, 
therefore, was to realign the legal order and set of property rights to achieve a better bargaining 
balance. Adams’ (1887: 90) referred to this process as “raising the plane of competitive action,” 
such as through new protective labor laws and growth of collective bargaining, with the idea that 
28 
 
this does replace competition but raises the floor on competition so it yields more just outcomes 
and therefore more cooperation and harmony in industry and higher economic performance.  
Ely’s book The Labor Movement in America (1886) stands as the first work in what later 
became the American field of industrial relations. He argues that trade unions and labor law are 
required to “remove disadvantages under which the great mass of workingmen suffer, and must 
continue to suffer unless they get relief either by voluntary combination or by combined political 
action” (p. 96). He notes in the same paragraph that orthodox economists maintain that 
promoting free competition in labor markets protects and advances workers’ interests but, he 
claims, this is a false view.  
Ely cites two reasons for this fallacy. The first is the NE view that competition creates an 
open playing field where the ordinary worker can get ahead through individual action. In reality, 
legal, social and economic inequalities tip the contest in favor of employers and make it difficult 
for the mass of workers to escape from a life in dangerous, low paid, and onerous jobs. The 
result, therefore, is “absence of actual equality between the two parties to the labor-contract, and 
the one-sided determination of the price and other conditions of labor” (p. 100). The second 
reason is the NE view that labor is essentially similar to other commodities and free DS 
competition, therefore, leads to beneficial outcomes. Ely argues, however, that because labor is 
embodied in human beings competition in labor markets does not work as DS theory predicts. 
Fluctuation in wages and jobs makes workers feel insecure, demoralized, and antagonistic 
toward employers, all of which undercuts efficiency and harmony in the workplace. Similarly, 
competition in labor markets can be destabilizing – “If the demand falls, labor cannot be 
withdrawn from the market like other wares. On the contrary, .... the supply must increase by 
reason of competition of a greater number of laborers …. [as] children and women seek labor to 
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eke out the father’s income” (p. 101). And, finally, workers are forced by mobility costs and lack 
of alternative jobs to “risk health in ill-ventilated rooms… and [their] lives ….by [employers’] 
failure to fence in dangerous equipment” (p. 106).      
 In 1905 Ely took the lead in founding the American Association for Labor Legislation 
(AALL). The AALL soon became the most important research and lobbying group in the 
country for expanded labor law and social insurance programs (Moss 1996). The group actively 
promoted workmen’s compensation, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, minimum 
wages, maximum hour limits, a ban on child labor, workplace safety legislation, universal health 
insurance, and counter-cyclical public works spending. A variety of economic and social 
arguments were advanced in favor of these measures. To illustrate I take two examples 
(Commons and Andrews 1916; Moss 1996; Kaufman 1997).  
The first is workmen’s compensation; that is, employer-financed payments out of a 
general fund to employees who have suffered loss of work due to a workplace accident. From an 
IEIR perspective, unregulated competition in labor markets leads to excessive injuries because 
workers possess poor information about safety risks and are often constrained from leaving 
unsafe jobs by mobility costs. On the employer side, firms often have small incentives to invest 
in safety because of a public goods problem (workers do not speak up about unsafe conditions 
out of fear of employer retaliation and therefore act as free riders in the hope someone else will 
do so) and the availability in most years of an ample supply of unemployed workers eager to 
replace the injured. Making employers pay an injury tax, therefore, gives them an incentive to 
improve safety; it forces employers to bear the cost of accidents as part of their total cost of 
production (rather than shift the cost to workers, families, or the community). And, finally, 
accident compensation is a humane and just payment to help unfortunate workers who because 
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of a workplace accident can no longer work to put food on the table. Thus, labor law serves to 
increase both efficiency and fairness.  
A second case is a legal minimum wage. It has a number of virtues that conventional 
economics mostly ignores. For example, a minimum wage puts a floor under labor markets and 
prevents sweatshop wages; stops a destabilizing fall in wages during recessions and depressions; 
provides an incentive to employers to improve operational efficiency, helps reduce income 
inequality; increases household income and aggregate demand in the economy; improves wages 
for the groups most exploited and discriminated against; draws people into the labor market and 
legitimate employment, and helps ensure that workers get at least a social minima of income.  
IEIR and the FL&EM dominated intellectual thought and policy making on labor law 
into the 1960s and 1970s. High water markets were the Progressive era (1900-1914), the New 
Deal (1933-1945), and the New Frontier/Great Society period (1961-1968). Ely passed on the 
IEIR baton to his student and colleague at Wisconsin, John Commons. Commons, like Ely 
before him, was elected by his peers to be president of the American Economic Association 
(1917) and was widely recognized as the nation’s foremost labor economist. Commons was a 
tireless advocate for the AALL program of expanded labor law, social insurance, collective 
bargaining, and government counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy. Economist Kenneth 
Boulding (1957) declared Commons was, “the intellectual father of the New Deal, of labor 
legislation, of social security, of the whole movement in the country toward a welfare state” (p. 
7).  
A puzzling question from today’s neoliberal/SL&EM perspective is this: how could 
Commons, presumptively considered by his peers to be a good economist, champion these 
interferences with the free market? The answer is that he considered but rejected the “assume a 
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competitive labor market” proposition as a sound place (by itself) for theorizing and evaluating 
labor law. Illustratively, he stated, “The commodity theory of labor…is not false, it is 
incomplete” (Commons 1919: 17). Later he amplified on this, saying (Commons 1950),   
Interference with the law of supply and demand has always been the main objection 
raised against all collective action, whether against protective tariffs, against immigration 
restriction, against labor unions, or against corporations; but these interferences have 
nonetheless been repeated and cumulated for a hundred years, because the alternatives of 
noninterference under the circumstances were deemed worse than the interferences. 
Public programs and policies cannot be evaluated in terms of logical consequences of 
isolated assumptions or similarities. They must be judged by the practical consequences 
of their operations. This requires a subtle balancing of many parts – some of which are 
necessarily contradictory (p. 137, italics added).  
 
Note in the first italicized part of the quote the IEIR proposition that the costs associated 
with labor law intervention in markets are positive but less than the costs incurred from 
continued laissez-faire. In the second italicized part is another IEIR theme; in particular, that 
labor law cannot be considered in isolation of historical and social context but, rather, must be 
evaluated in terms of the conditions of the time, as part of a complete package (system) of 
industrial relations institutions and practices, with a goal of achieving economic and social 
balance, and recognition that not all parts of an industrial relations system can be made to 
smoothly work together.  
Later generations of IEIR economists have staked-out the same position. I provide three 
examples. All three concern the case for unions and collective bargaining but the implications 
are identical for labor law. The first is Harry Millis, professor of economics at Chicago, president 
of the American Economic Association (1934), and a pre-WWII institutional-oriented economist. 
In testimony to Congress on the proposed National Labor Relations Act, he states (National 
Labor Relations Board 1985: 1553-54):  
“Of course, if there were perfect mobility of labor, keen competition for labor, and no 
concerted control of wages and hours by employers, the situation would be substantially 
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different from what it has been and the case for collective bargaining would be less 
conclusive in modern industry. I am aware that many of my academic brethren assume 
that these conditions just mentioned are generally true, and reason that in the absence of 
such friction in the market, wages, hours, and all the rest of it rather steadily adjust 
themselves to what industry, and consumers, should and can bear.”  
 
But he then goes on to explain (pp. 1553-54), 
The truth, as I see it, is ….. that the competitive demand for labor, while important, does 
not go far in protecting the workers against long hours, excessive overtime, fines, 
discharge, without sufficient cause, and objectionable working conditions…. One is thus 
driven to the conclusion that…. hours of work and conditions of work -- things which 
intimately concern workmen, are best decided collectively -- through legislation or 
through collective bargaining, and some of them are not easily subject to legislative 
control. This is particularly true of a reasonable degree of security of tenure. The case for 
collective bargaining is only less strong with respect to wages.  
 
A second example is economist Lloyd Reynolds, a president of the Industrial Relations 
Research Association (1955). He states (Reynolds 1954: 543) as a general principle, “[I]t is 
apparent that local labor markets in this country …. are not highly competitive.” He goes on to 
amplify on this observation (p. 549): 
“Only in theory, then, does the ‘competitive labor market’ provide an alternative to wage 
determination through collective bargaining. The practical alternative is collective 
bargaining versus wage-setting by employers with rather weak competitive checks. 
Under non-union conditions, the immobility of the majority of workers plus the 
unsystematic selection of jobs by those in search of work gives employers wide latitude 
in determining wage rates and other conditions of employment. An employer can offer 
terms considerably below those generally prevailing in the area and still secure an 
adequate labor force. He is subject to serious competitive pressure mainly at the peak of 
business cycles, when job opportunities in other plants are relatively plentiful. Even after 
years of high unemployment, one still finds large differences in the wages offered by 
different employers for the same jobs.”  
 
 A third example of the IEIR perspective comes from John Dunlop. In an interview 
published in 2002 (Kaufman 2002: 338) he states, 
“I would surely agree that in some cases unions and collective bargaining have made 
wage rates uneconomic. This is undesirable. But I have several problems with the view 
you have just stated [the neoclassical critique of unions]. I reject out of hand any 
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argument that the economy would be better off without unions. Unions do not come into 
the picture and distort some ‘perfect’ wage structure, because there is no such thing. In 
the real world there are all kinds of distortions and inequities built into the wage 
structure, as any person who has set wages knows. To assume in a model that wages are 
‘competitive’ is to assume away a large part of the reality.” 
 
In an earlier essay, Dunlop explicitly takes the same position that Commons enunciated 
more than six decades earlier regarding the “assume a competitive labor market” proposition. 
That is, the model by itself is too narrow and simplistic to serve as an adequate tool for 
understanding labor markets and labor law. Thus, Dunlop  (1984) declares, “the competitive 
model, or economic considerations alone, are not an adequate tool unassisted by…. industrial 
relations tools and concepts” (p. 23). Several years later “second-best” macroeconomist Robert 
Solow repeats the same theme: “It does not follow from any of this that the ordinary forces of 
supply and demand are irrelevant to the labor market, or that we can do without the textbook 
apparatus altogether. It only follows that they are incomplete and need completing” (Solow 
1990: 22).  
As reviewed earlier in this chapter, mainstream economists have in the last two-to-three 
decades substantially generalized and extended the competitive model and incorporated many 
frictions and imperfections, including the existence of hierarchical firms and structured internal 
labor markets. From an IEIR perspective, this is all to the good and helps bring NE and IEIR 
together toward a middle ground.  
There remains, however, a divide along several dimensions. One is methodological-
based. The way that many NE/NIE economists have incorporated labor market frictions and 
internal firm structures into standard DS theory is to add them as additional constraints in an 
optimization model (Becker 1976; Lazear 2000). By the nature of optimization, however, the 
resulting outcomes (e.g., unemployment because of job search costs; discrimination because of 
34 
 
imperfect information) are efficient in the sense they cannot be improved upon (anything less, by 
definition, is not optimization). If, in turn, they cannot be improved upon, then evidently no 
opportunity exists in labor markets for labor law or unions to improve the situation. Hence, 
NE/NIE incorporates frictions and imperfections but in a way that still leads to (mostly) non-
interventionist conclusions. Gregory Dow, in a review article of NIE, well articulates this 
situation. He explains (Dow 1997: 60),  
“A great deal of intellectual effort has gone into the construction of economic rationales 
for existing organizational practices…. This reflects a tendency among most NIE writers 
to assume, at least prima facie, that actual employment practices represent efficient 
solutions to complex contracting problems. This efficiency assumption is useful in 
generating explanatory hypotheses of a functionalist kind (employment practice X exists 
because it satisfies efficiency criterion Y under environment conditions Z). However, it 
also places a heavy burden of proof on advocates of labor market regulation by obliging 
them to identify specific market failures that warrant government intervention. One must 
often read between the lines (and squint hard) in order to discover a rationale for 
regulatory policy in the NIE.”   
  
On one hand, IEIR recognizes we do not live in a perfect, frictionless world and therefore 
some employment problems are bound to arise as the nature of things. On the other hand, they 
also worry that this type of optimization modeling ends-up being an ex post rationalization; that 
is, if we observe it then it must be efficient (since people have an incentive to maximize joint 
surplus and exhaust gains from trade). They also believe it is impossible to explain many features 
of employment relationships as an efficient contract outcome of economizing behavior. Thus, 
Dunlop (1994) concludes that, “the new institutional economics has little to contribute….to an 
understanding of internal labor markets” (p. 395) and “It is an unacceptable position, in my view, 
to define an internal labor market simply as a ‘set of explicit or implicit, more or less long-term 
agreements between a firm and its workers’.”   
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The second divide concerns the role of inequality. The NE second welfare theorem 
(earlier described) asserts as a matter of theory that economic efficiency is separable from 
economic inequality; as a practical matter most work in SL&EM does not actively give attention 
to inequality of outcomes on the argument that distributional fairness is an ethical and subjective 
matter and therefore not one amenable to economic analysis. Posner (2007: 14-15), for example, 
argues that economists cannot resolve normative debates over fairness but can generally agree on 
the more delimited normative goal of maximizing the value of output (i.e., attaining efficient 
outcomes). Work in the FL&EM and institutional economics tradition, however, insists that a 
separation between distribution and efficiency is untenable on theory grounds because fairness is 
a fundamental determinant of workplace relations and therefore productivity and firm 
performance (e.g., Commons 1934; Akerlof 1990; Bewley 1999; Befort and Budd 2009). 
Further, distribution determines the location of the DS curves in the labor market diagram and 
whether wages and conditions of employment are high or low; this is particularly important for 
evaluating labor law since the size of compensating wage differentials that are relied on by 
SL&EM to provide correct incentives to firms in matters such as workplace safety and fair 
treatment will themselves be high or low depending on distribution. Likewise, IEIR notes that 
efficiency also has an ethical and subjective dimension -- because it rests on opportunity costs 
that are a function of individual preferences and valuation -- and is in this respect on no firmer 
theoretical ground than fairness (Samuels and Schmid 1981). Finally, to put aside distributional 
fairness is to privilege the status quo of income and wealth in society.   
A third divide concerns the relevant variables to be included in the social welfare 
function for evaluating public policy in general and labor law in particular (Budd and Scoville 
2005; Gross and Compa 2009). Making maximum value of output the criterion privileges 
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consumers’ interests because they gain from abundant low priced goods but slights workers’ 
interests because labor is in this framework treated as simply another factor input that should be 
given pay, conditions, and treatment no higher than the minimum the market allows. IEIR insists, 
on the other hand, that since labor is embodied in human beings that workers’ interests in good 
pay, reasonable hours and conditions, and a satisfying work life need to also get explicit weight 
in the social welfare function for otherwise the material objects made in the economy are given 
higher priority than the human beings who make them (Kaufman 2005). Giving attention to 
workers’ interests, in turn, means that efficiency in production has to be balanced with other 
workplace considerations that SL&EM slights, such as human rights at work, democratic firm 
governance (e.g., due process, voice), and jobs that build-up the capabilities and character of the 
nation’s people.  
 
 
VI. IEIR Principles and Concepts 
Given this introduction, I want to move toward greater development and analytical 
representation of the theoretical framework used by IEIR/FL&EM to examine and evaluate labor 
law and labor institutions. This builds on earlier work by this author (e.g., Kaufman 1997, 2003a, 
2007a,b) and other relevant studies. A general overview of the institutional approach to L&E is 
provided by Samuels and Schmid (1981) and Mercuro and Medema (1997). I proceed in a two-
step process: first, delineation of key concepts and principles in this section and, second, in the 
next section a diagrammatic exposition. Certain points described above are reiterated for 
purposes of emphasis and inclusiveness. Also, certain complementary concepts and ideas of 
Coase and the NIE are brought over to IEIR. The list of IEIR principles given below starts with 
37 
 
philosophical/normative underpinnings and then transitions to theoretical concepts and ideas 
important at the individual, firm and economy level.     
Purpose of an economy. The purpose of an economy is to serve human ends. One way it 
does this is to operate efficiently so people have the maximum of goods and services. But the 
grand objective of human existence is not efficiency (the “largest GDP”) but the “good life” 
(Slichter 1931). What exactly constitutes the good life is subject to debate, but it certainly 
includes greater amounts of economic security, procedural and distributive justice, and 
opportunities for self-development and self-actualization than are provided by the efficiency 
criterion alone (Budd 2004; Sunstein 2004). IEIR proponents agree that economic policy should 
seek to get society on the production possibility frontier but only if the “goods” (or “social 
wealth”) included in calculating the frontier include not just GDP-type goods but also goods such 
as economic security, social justice, fulfilling jobs and healthful working conditions. Without 
this broader perspective, the interests of people (including workers) get subordinated by a narrow 
efficiency/materialist welfare objective to doing what is best for the economy, rather than 
structuring and operating the economy to benefit people.   
Liberty. The NE version of liberty is negative liberty – i.e., absence of restraint – which 
leads these economists to advocate minimal government market regulation. From an IEIR 
perspective, however, “liberty to starve” or “liberty to work a fourteen hour day” is not an 
attractive conception of liberty; likewise, to say that both a poor person and rich person have an 
equal freedom to quit a dangerous or dirty job if they do not like it greatly empties the concept of 
freedom of meaningful significance (Adams 1897; Samuels, Medema and Schmid 1997; Fried 
1998). Seen in this light, freedom of contract may be a façade that hides the whip of economic 
coercion wielded by one person with control of strategic resources (e.g., an employer offering 
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scarce job opportunities) over another person who has few resources and must trade or go hungry 
(e.g., an employee with dependent family members and no alternatives source of income). 
Proponents of IEIR, therefore, base their theory and policy program on a concept of positive 
liberty. Each person has positive liberty when they have the resources needed to command the 
essentials of life, thus giving them not only the legal space to construct their life but also the 
economic space (Sen 1999). 
Labor is Human. In NE labor is modeled as not substantively different from other factor 
inputs or goods and services and, hence, labor markets are also modeled as not substantively 
different from other kinds of markets (Addison and Hirsch 1997). Further, from a welfare 
perspective labor is solely considered as a factor input that does not itself count in social welfare 
but rather contributes to welfare only to the extent it is efficiently used to produce final goods 
and services for consumers. In IEIR explicit recognition is given to the fact that labor services 
are embodied in human beings (Commons and Andrews 1916; Budd 2004; Kaufman 2010b). 
This fact, it is maintained, fundamentally changes theorizing about labor; it also calls attention to 
the fact that if the goal of an economy is to improve human welfare then people’s welfare as 
workers should be given consideration above and beyond their contribution to production and 
satisfaction of consumers’ interests. 
 Behavioral/Social Model of the Human Agent. People are modeled as largely 
purposeful and self-interested, but decision-making is subject to bounded rationality and 
behavior is influenced by emotions, social interdependencies, and ethical precepts (Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler 1998; Kaufman 1999; Schmid 2004). A key part of bounded rationality is 
that many future events are subject to fundamental uncertainty -- that is, cannot be represented 
by even a probability distribution; another key part is the distorting effect imparted to behavior 
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by emotions such as anger, hate, love and pride. The first feature means that when fundamental 
uncertainty enters into decision-making human beings cannot even hypothetically solve a 
maximization model since the choice set is not well-defined; the second means that rational 
calculation is partly or wholly displaced and other non-logical motives dominate decision-
making.   
Transactions and Transaction Cost. A transaction is a legal transfer of ownership; 
transaction cost is the real resources used to effectuate and enforce this transfer (Commons 1934; 
Coase 1937). 
Ownership and property rights. Institutional economics is built on the concept of 
ownership and correlative concept of property rights, per the statement of Commons (1934: 5) 
that “ownership becomes the foundation of institutional economics.” Property rights also figure 
prominently in the NIE (Coase 1992; Furubotn and Richter 2005).Without prior specification of 
property rights and ownership fundamental economic constructs such as commodities, 
production functions, and demand and supply curves have no basis. These property rights also 
include not only ownership of economic goods but fundamental human and social rights.  
Institutions. Institutions are bodies of rules, both formal and informal and explicit and 
tacit, that are built out of property rights (broadly defined) and define the rules of the economic 
game and the constraints, opportunity sets, incentives, and strategic interdependencies faced by 
economic agents (Commons 1934; Coase 1992; Groenewegen, Spithoven, and Van Den Berg 
2010). All economic activity is “institutional” since its takes place within and is structured and 
guided by human-made institutions; it is also inextricably linked to concerns of fairness and 
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status since the laws, rules, norms and customs created and enforced by institutions serve in part 
to apportion justice and social standing.    
 The Employment Relationship: Workers most often provide labor services in an 
institution called the employment relationship (ER). Unlike competitive goods markets, the 
buyer and seller of labor are embedded in a personal, long term, and socially interdependent 
relationship where many things besides price mediate and coordinate the exchange (Dunlop 
1994; Befort and Budd 2009). It is also essential to recognize that the employment contract is a 
rental agreement for labor services.  
 Incomplete Employment Contracts: Because of bounded rationality, imperfect and 
asymmetric information, fundamental uncertainty, and the interdependent and complex nature of 
production tasks, transaction cost is both positive and large in most ERs. As a result, 
employment contracts are necessarily incomplete, contingent and open-ended and subject to 
numerous forms of externality, public good, moral hazard, opportunism, principal-agent 
problem, and tacit bargaining (Simon 1951; Marsden 1999).  
 Labor Time vs. Labor Power. Because of the incomplete nature of employment 
contracts it is necessary to distinguish between labor time and labor power (Thompson and 
Newsome 2004; Kaufman 2010b). Labor time is the sixty minutes that workers are required to be 
on the employers’ premises in return for the hourly wage; labor power is the amount of work 
(physical, mental and emotional effort) the employees do during the sixty minutes to produce 
goods and services. The goal of firms is to extract the maximum labor power for the minimum of 
cost and push-back; the goal of workers is to get the highest return for their labor power with a 
reasonable limit on the maximum amount of labor power to be delivered. In some branches of 
IEIR the extraction of labor power is called the labor process, in others it is called the 
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wage/effort bargain (Baldamus 1961).The labor process and wage/effort bargain create an 
inherent, if partial, conflict of interest in the employment relationship. They also set up a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type bargaining game (Miller 1991) where there is the possibility of a win-
win outcome (employees provide high labor power; employers provide good paying secure jobs) 
but also a strong built-in tendency for emergence of a win-lose (or even lose-lose) outcome as 
one or both parties follow short-term self-interest and opportunistically take advantage of the 
other (e.g., employees provide high labor power; employers lay-off surplus workers). Employers 
create a human resource management system for the purpose of maximizing extracted labor 
power through a variety of control, supervisory and disciplinary devices (Edwards 1979; 
Edwards 2009).  
Cooperation, Trust, Fairness and Job Security: Production is in most cases an 
interdependent process that requires active cooperation among workers and managers. The 
degree of cooperation (including work effort) is a choice variable for workers; low cooperation 
typically means low productivity and profits and high cooperation means the reverse. Many 
factors influence workers’ willingness to cooperate but among the most important are trust, 
fairness and job security (Akerlof 1990: Budd 2004). Because of the Prisoner Dilemma nature of 
the ER, absent a spirit of trust, fairness, and shared rewards one or both parties easily gravitate 
toward the non-cooperation/low productivity option (Miller 1991; Schmid 2004). 
Modes of coordination. Economies have alternative institutional modes for coordinating 
transactions; the two most important for theory are (1) markets and price, and (2) organizations 
and command (Williamson 1985; Coase 1992; Kaufman 2003b; Groenewegen, Spithoven and 
Van Den Berg 2010).   
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Power. Power is the ability to satisfy one’s desires and obtain a greater share of an 
institution’s scarce goods (material and non-material). Power is influenced by how greatly an 
economic agent needs/wants an outcome and how long the agent can hold out in the bargaining 
vis a vis the other side (Samuels, Medema and Schmid 1997).  
Imperfect Competition: Labor markets are by their nature not only imperfect (in the 
economist’s sense) but among the most imperfect in the economy (Lester 1941; Thurow 1983). 
Competitive forces are present and the demand/supply model has some degree of explanatory 
power; nonetheless, in the short-medium run most labor markets exhibit substantial wage 
rigidity, constraints on labor mobility, and in most years excess labor supply (involuntary 
unemployment). These conditions mean labor markets are not self-regulating via flexible wages 
and are therefore partially coordinated by other means (e.g., labor quantity and quality 
adjustments); likewise, market outcomes may depart widely from competitive or efficient 
contract predictions and, in particular, conditions of discrimination, exploitation, and unfair 
treatment have significant space to emerge and persist in employment relationships.  
Segmented Labor Markets: Labor markets are divided into segments more complex and 
variegated than the standard competitive versus monopsony categories (Kerr 1977; Dunlop 
1994). Segmentation arises from factors that impede competitive forces and the flow of labor 
across firms and markets, including institutional rules (e.g., seniority systems, occupational 
licensing), different educational requirements, firm-specific skills, discrimination and social 
norms, and job search costs and the human desire for security. Segmentation impedes and 
replaces competitive DS forces; hence, wage rates and other terms and conditions of employment 
exhibit considerable diversity across firms and market segments. Some elements of this 
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dispersion are equalizing (or “compensating” in the competitive sense) but many others are non-
equalizing.  
Internal Labor Markets: A major form of segmentation is the internal labor market 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Osterman 1987; Dunlop 1994). Firms create ILMs because they 
contribute to greater productivity and profit (e.g., by coordinating and controlling labor power 
and upgrading skills) and positive employee relations; they therefore have a strong efficiency 
rationale. They are also a major instrument for controlling/coordinating labor power. ILMs, 
however, also partially supplant and replace coordination via competition and market forces with 
management command and administration. ILMs are embedded in a hierarchical system of 
management power and authority and market forces and the quit option provide workers with 
only partial protection, particularly with regard to items not easily divisible and fungible into 
money (e.g., collective aspects of working conditions and treatment).   
 Inequality of Bargaining Power: Employers both individually and as a group have a 
power advantage over individual workers in both external wage bargaining and internal firm 
governance due to their legal authority over work (the “master-servant relationship”), control of 
the supply of jobs, the perishability of labor services (inability to inventory), workers’ limited 
hold-out ability (from limited financial reserves, significant fixed costs of family subsistence), 
costly job search and restricted job opportunities, and tilted legal rules and resource endowments 
Commons and Andrews 1916; Kaufman 2010c). These conditions create a “tipped playing field” 
both “within the market” and “before the market” that favor firms’ interests in exchange and 
governance relationships, thus allowing employers to capture a disproportionate and possibly 
unjust/unreasonable share of economic surplus, workplace control, and life satisfaction.  
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Sovereignty. Economics is always “political economy” because the institutions and their 
derivative rules which guide and structure economic activity are in part determined through a 
political process in which people individually and collectively seek to capture and use the power 
of sovereignty to shape the institutions and rules to promote their interests (Commons 1950).   
Reasonable value. Economic agents individually and collectively have a notion of what 
is fair and reasonable; whenever an outcome/process falls outside the bound of reasonableness 
they undertake action to alter the institutional matrix of rules and rights (Adams, 1897; 
Commons 1934; Mercuro and Medema 1997; McIntyre and Ramstad 2002).  
 Say’s Law and Under-Consumption: For all the reasons cited, flexible wages cannot 
and do not act as an effective equilibrating mechanism in all but perhaps the very long-run, 
contrary to the macroeconomic principle known as Say’s Law. Rather, labor markets often 
remain out of equilibrium (in the sense of a demand/supply imbalance) for months and years and 
restoration of equilibrium comes about as much from labor quantity and quality adjustment (e.g., 
demand/supply curve shifts) as from wage adjustment. Wage adjustments are slow, not because 
of unions or minimum wage laws – the usual parties blamed in NE – but because firms try to 
avoid cutting wages knowing that worker morale and productivity fall as a result (Bewley 1999; 
Fehr and Falk 1999). At a macro level, even with completely flexible wages the aggregate labor 
market is not self-correcting since wage cuts reduce household income and aggregate demand 
and, hence, cause production and employment to depart even further from full-employment 
equilibrium (Keynes 1936; Levendis 2007). Likewise, a free market economy is prone to under-
consumption in the medium-to-long run because the bulk of the fruits of productivity growth are 
distributed to a relatively small group in the top part of the income distribution who have more 
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inelastic labor supply curves (due to scarcity of unique talents, skills, positions) and thus reap a 
proportionately large part of real wage gains from economic growth (e.g., CEOs).  
 
VII. Analytical Framework: An IEIR Model of Labor Markets 
This section puts these general principles into an analytical framework, shown in Figure 2. This 
model of labor markets has five parts. I describe them in order here, in the next section set them 
in motion to explain labor/employment outcomes, and then in the final section consider the 
model’s implications for labor law both past and present.  
The base-line economy represented by this model is free market capitalism without labor 
law, trade unions, social safety net programs, or macroeconomic guidance – in other words, 
something close to the American labor market in the early 1900s when FL&EM took shape 
(Fishback 1998; Kaufman 2008). Applications to today’s economy are then sketched. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
First panel (a). It has numerous distinguishing features. The area of the pentagon shape 
represents the size of GDP, usually represented in NE by a pie diagram. Part of the annual GDP 
has to go toward reproduction of the system -- that is, a minimum necessary amount to replenish 
capital, maintain the fertility of the land, and feed and clothe the workforce. Sometimes the 
reproduction level for labor is called the “social minima” or “social wage.” The remainder of the 
GDP is available as a surplus or “discretionary income” that can be distributed to alternative uses 
and people; for example, it may be distributed as wages or profit or used for consumption, capital 
accumulation, or defense. The area under the horizontal dashed line represents the reproduction 
part of GDP, the part above it is the economic surplus (Davis 1992). The process of economic 
growth expands the pentagon shape and the size of the surplus; it contracts during recessions and 
depressions. The reproduction amount of GDP also grows over time, partly to cover greater 
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capital depreciation and also because labor’s social minima is in part culturally and historically 
conditioned. For example, the social minima in real terms is greater in 2000 than 1900 because 
of higher needs and expectations regarding education, health care, and housing.  
The pentagon shape also represents the institutional infrastructure that coordinates and 
regulates the economy; it is the human-created command and control function. Institutional 
economists call it the governance system (Commons 1950; Williamson 1985). The pentagon 
shape captures five important IEIR ideas.  
The first is that all economic activity is embedded in an institutional infrastructure of 
laws, property rights, and social relations that collectively set the rules of the game, the 
endowments of the actors, and the objectives they pursue (Mercuro and Medema 1997; Deakin 
and Wilkinson 2005). These factors determine whether markets exist, their structure and 
operation, and outcomes of DS. This idea is illustrated in panel (a) where the labor market and 
DS are surrounded by and embedded within this pentagon-shaped institutional infrastructure, 
also called in American IR the “web of rules” (Kerr and Siegel 1955; Dunlop 1958). The 
institutional infrastructure is taken as a “given” in NE microeconomics and, for most purposes, 
omitted from consideration (e.g., it is an invisible, passive, and status quo condition in Figure 1).  
The second idea is that the institutional order is politically determined through some 
social choice process (e.g., dictatorship, monarchy, democracy) and contending factions and 
classes endeavor to use the power of sovereignty so as to shape the rules of the game to promote 
their interests (Samuels and Schmid 1981). Here is represented the political economy dimension 
of IEIR. A frequent argument in SL&EM is that the common law evolves to promote efficiency 
and groups wanting to displace the common law with legislated labor law are often engaged in 
non-productive rent-seeking. This is a common charge leveled against the political activity of 
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labor unions, for example (Epstein 1983). IEIR, however, argues that the common law refracts 
the constellation of political power in society and evolves through political contestation between 
insiders and outsiders (Mercuro and Medema 1997). It is important to ask, therefore: whose 
interests are being served by wealth maximization and is society satisfied with the resulting 
distribution of income and wealth? These questions are not answered by neutral economic law 
but by the governance structure that sets endowments and rules of the game. The reasonableness 
of economic outcomes, therefore, hinges critically on the distribution of power in society and 
whether its political and social institutions are open and egalitarian or segmented and oligarchic. 
If the latter, then what may look to NE as rent-seeking looks to IEIR as a social reform 
movement led by progressive groups such as trade unions on behalf of disadvantaged outsiders 
demanding equal rights – be they workers’ rights for protection from unfair dismissal, women’s 
rights for equal pay, African-American’s rights for a discrimination-free workplace, or gay-
lesbian rights for employment regardless of sexual preference.  
The third idea is that as a command and control system the institutional infrastructure 
inherently creates asymmetric power and authority relations where a relatively small group at the 
top of the pentagon are power-holders and order-givers and a much larger group toward the 
bottom have little power and follow orders. Since competition in labor markets is attenuated, 
they cannot provide a complete check and balance to the exercise of power and authority and, 
accordingly, society must ensure that the governance structure meets reasonable standards for 
due process, voice and representation. In IEIR this was historically expressed as a demand for 
industrial democracy (Webb and Webb 1897; Derber 1970). 
The fourth idea is that the economy is not a natural law-like mechanism where some 
unseen gravity-like invisible hand automatically and without friction coordinates economic 
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activity to an a-historical equilibrium but, rather, is an organic human-made structure that 
evolves over time as the institutional infrastructure evolves and depends on not only impersonal 
market forces for coordination but also the visible hand of administration, governance, 
management and planning (Commons 1935; Galbraith 1967; Chandler 1977; Rutherford 2001).  
The fifth is that the pentagon-shaped governance system applies not only at the macro 
level of the economy but also at the micro level of the firm. That is, the NE firm exists as a 
technological production function and an invisible entrepreneur operates it by changing the mix 
of factor inputs in response to shifting market prices. In branches of the NIE, firms are a locus of 
efficient contracts that get adjusted in a similar manner to changing market and shadow prices 
(Furubotn and Richter 2005). In IEIR and other branches of NIE, on the other hand, the firm is a 
politically constructed entity with a property rights regime and hierarchy of power that is 
coordinated through a visible hand process of administration, management, planning and 
strategic choice by a chief executive officer, descending order of vice-presidents and directors, 
and various line and staff managers (e.g., human resource managers). The pentagon, invisible in 
the NE theory of the firm, creates an internal labor market (ILM) and where HRM acts as a 
“ministry of labor” and through central planning sets pay rates and assigns jobs (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971; Rubery and Grimshaw 1998). This process is broadly constrained by competitive 
forces in the ELM, but not deterministically so. 
Panel (a) shows two sets of demand-supply curves, a set of pencil-thin lines and a set of 
broad bands. The former represent DS in the competitive model (as earlier depicted in Figure 1) 
and the latter represent DS in the IEIR model. A detailed explanation is provided shortly. Panel 
(b) takes the DS bands from panel (a) and adds two further features. The first is that the band-
like nature of the DS functions creates an area of indeterminacy in wages and other terms and 
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conditions of employment, illustrated in the diagram by the bell-shaped curve. The idea is that 
organizational and institutional frictions partially obstruct competitive forces and therefore give 
individual firms some discretion regarding the wages and conditions they provide (Lester 1952; 
Dunlop 1957). The average wage in the market is W1; it is bounded, however, by a dispersion 
ranging from W2 at the highest wage firm to W3 at the lowest wage firm. The size of the area of 
indeterminacy may narrow somewhat in the long run but it tends to have considerable 
persistence.  
Panel (b) also depicts the labor supply curve facing the typical individual firm in this 
market. In the competitive model the firm has a perfectly elastic (horizontal) labor supply curve 
(not illustrated in Figures 1 or 2), showing that the firm pays whatever is the market wage. IEIR 
argues, however, that the firm’s labor supply curve typically resembles the kinked line EF. 
Assume this firm is paying the average market wage W1 and has hired L2 workers. The kinked 
supply function shows three things: first, the firm can pay infra-marginal workers a wage lower 
than W1 (the downward sloping portion) and many of its employees will stay with their jobs. 
Hence, the firm has some monopsony power (Manning 2003; Erickson and Mitchell 2008). 
Second, the firm can modestly expand its workforce with new hires of roughly the same effective 
labor at the prevailing rate of average hourly earnings. This is depicted by the horizontal segment 
of the supply line, the length of which is partly determined by the amount of involuntary 
unemployment in the local labor market. Past some certain point, however, additional workforce 
expansion necessitates either a higher money wage or, what is the same thing in production cost 
terms, hiring new people who bring to the job a lower level of effective labor (e.g., less skills or 
desirable work habits). In this range the firm’s labor supply function is upward sloping, as in 
monopsony.  
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Panel (c) of Figure 2 introduces the macroeconomic dimension of the employment 
relationship. NE has no need to feature such a model in Figure 1 because it assumes flexible 
prices and the invisible hand automatically steer labor markets and the aggregate economy to an 
equilibrium position of full employment via Say’s Law. IEIR, however, claims that an economy 
has no such automatic tendency toward full employment and, indeed, the base-line condition is 
persistent excess supply of labor (Atkinson and Oleson 1998). A convenient representation of the 
IEIR position is the “Keynesian cross” model. Aggregate demand determines the level of output 
and employment, given by the intersection of the C+I+G schedule (consumption + investment + 
government spending) and the aggregate supply line (45 degree line). The full employment level 
of GDP is Q1 but in most years the economy suffers from insufficient aggregate demand and 
hence an actual output of only Q2 with consequent overhang of unemployment in the labor 
market. Market forces do not eliminate the excess labor supply, partly because wages have a 
large degree of rigidity and partly because a fall in wages reduces purchasing power and 
therefore further reduces aggregate demand and employment.    
Panel (d) captures the IEIR distinction between labor time and labor power. Pictured 
there are two short-run production functions; they show how output increases with additional 
labor input (holding capital constant). In NE the economy has one unique output curve, such as 
the dashed line. The reason is that NE treats labor as a homogeneous commodity that generates a 
well-defined marginal product in a technologically determined production process. Thus, for a 
given labor input level L2 output is a single-valued number, such as Q2 (Q2 corresponding, in 
turn, to Q2 in panel (c)). At full employment the maximum labor input is L1 and the NE 
production function predicts a single-valued output of Q1.  
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In IEIR, on the other hand, what the employer buys is L2 amount of labor time but the 
amount of output produced is a function of the amount of labor power obtained. The result is that 
in panel (d) a purchased amount of labor time L2 can yield a wide range of different labor 
powers, depending on the outcome of the wage/effort bargain and the extraction effectiveness of 
the employer’s HRM program. The solid line production function shows that the maximum 
attainable labor power is Q3; the shaded area under this line shows all the other feasible levels of 
labor power. The employer who buys L2 units of labor time may get zero labor power (a point on 
the horizontal axis) if, for example, the workers stage a spontaneous walk-out or are all asleep in 
their trucks.  
Panel (e) illustrates a pay-off matrix of employment relations outcomes. It represents the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma nature of the ER. Employers and employees, respectively, can either choose 
to cooperate with each other or defect from the relationship and pursue narrow self-interest. This 
choice set creates the pay-off matrix shown in the diagram where the employment relationship 
can take one of four possible outcomes for the employer and employees: lose/lose, win/lose, 
lose/win, and win/win.    
 
VIII. IEIR Model in Action: How Labor Markets Really Work 
The next step is to put these diagrams into action to analyze how labor markets and 
employment relationships work and the nature of the outcomes they generate. The end product is 
a portrait of the employment world considerably different than one gets from “assume a 
competitive labor market,” with correspondingly different implications for labor law.  
An employment relationship presumes as a matter of definition that firms have at least 
two people, a boss and worker. Coase (1937) and the NIE have explained that this agglomeration 
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into a firm arises only if transaction cost is positive; the implication, therefore, is that in a 
situation of zero transaction cost all the firms disagglomerate to single person proprietorships 
and independent contractors. They have not, however, carried this insight to its logical 
conclusion (Kaufman 2010b). 
With zero transaction cost the entire GDP in panel (a) is produced by single person firms. 
In this case, however, the economy has no need for a labor market or employment relationship 
since firms get labor services from other single person firms in product markets. An implication 
of Coasean logic, therefore, is that the DS diagram in panel (a) actually represents buying and 
selling of labor services in product markets, not labor markets. That is, rather than go to a labor 
market and hire Joe Smith to be an employee truck driver the firm goes to a product market and 
hires Joe Smith Trucking, Inc. to provide the service (Joe can get the funds to buy the truck since 
capital markets are also competitive). Without labor markets, however, the DS diagram in our 
Figure 1 (and Posner’s Figure 1.2) -- the core representation of “assume a competitive labor 
market” in NE and SL&EM and the core theoretical device that drives their analysis of labor law 
-- disappears and has no coherent theoretical existence. The reason is that the competitive labor 
DS model implicitly assumes zero transaction cost and therefore frictionless trade and complete 
contracts; if these conditions exist, however, hiring employees in order to gain the legal right to 
direct/control their labor has no economic rationale since all performance requirements can be 
written into a complete sales contract and enforced at zero cost (Dow 1997).  
Taking the logic in reverse, multi-person firms, labor markets, and an employment 
relationship only exist with positive transaction cost. But positive transaction cost arises from 
market frictions (e.g., bounded rationality, uncertainty, imperfect information); hence, the 
implication is that labor markets are always and everywhere imperfectly competitive. If labor 
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markets are imperfectly competitive, however, the first welfare theorem is no longer applicable 
and, hence, one cannot presume that market outcomes are efficient. Further, by the theory of the 
second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) one cannot presume that selective re-engineering of 
labor markets to make them more competitive will actually improve efficiency (it may worsen). 
The production of the nation’s GDP in panel (a), therefore, takes place in a mixed economy with 
a combination of markets and firms and price and planning coordination. Competitive forces are 
present but necessarily attenuated and therefore offer only partial protection to employees.  
Critics of the IEIR position may object at this point that more deeply examined this 
alleged “labor problem” (e.g., an area of indeterminacy in wages with attenuated competition) is 
not a problem in any substantive sense and therefore employees have no need of labor law 
protection. Such an argument, as earlier explained, is likely to invoke one or a combination of 
two arguments (Mercuro and Medema 1997; Dow 1997). The first is that alleged anomalies in 
labor markets, such as dispersed wage rates and costs of job mobility, are themselves rational 
economizing outcomes in the face of various costs and constraints not included in the simple 
competitive model (e.g., imperfect information); the second is that these observed labor market 
outcomes can be assumed on prima facie grounds to approximate efficient outcomes since, if 
they are not, economic agents have incentives to modify arrangements in order to capture 
additional gains from trade. As indicated earlier, IEIR does not completely discount these 
arguments; however, IEIR also believes they carry the danger of turning into tautology and an 
apologia for the status quo. That is, what significant labor market anomaly cannot be explained 
as an economizing outcome and, if the answer is none or close thereto (noting here that Becker 
(1976) claims the extended NE model can explain all human behavior in market and non-market 
contexts), then doesn’t NE/NIE theory become a vehicle for an efficiency rationalization of 
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whatever is observed? Opinions differ on this matter; the position of IEIR, however, is that labor 
markets and employment relationships are imperfect in a substantively important market failure 
sense and these imperfections open-up space in economic relations for labor law and labor 
institutions to do good as well as harm.  
The merits of the IEIR case for labor law are strengthened by giving further consideration 
to the ramifications of positive transaction cost in labor markets. As explained above, the pencil-
thin DS lines in panel (a) have no logical existence; hence, the labor market cannot determine an 
equilibrium wage and set of terms and conditions. Instead, the DS lines are replaced in panels (a) 
and (b) by DS bands. On the demand side, this change is a logical outcome of the indeterminate 
nature of the wage/effort bargain in the labor process in panel (d). That is, the amount of labor 
time purchased is determinate but the amount of labor power and the size of the marginal product 
is uncertain and takes a range of possible values (Kaufman 2010a). Imperfect information and 
job search costs make the labor supply curve a band.  
The indeterminate nature of the labor demand curve means that the law of demand does 
not locally hold; for example, a modest rise in the minimum wage may not cause a decline in 
employment (Doucoliagos and Stanley 2008). Likewise, employers have some discretion 
regarding the wage and conditions they provide and the threat of exit by workers is only partially 
effective in determining employers’ HRM and employee relations practices. These implications 
are reinforced when panel (b) is considered.  
The rising portion of firms’ labor supply curve gives them some degree of monopsony 
power over inframarginal employees (because of mobility costs for workers if they quit).  
Monopsony power, in turn, means that firms gain the upper hand in wage bargaining and can 
practice some degree of labor exploitation (underpayment of workers). In the IEIR theory of 
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labor markets, nearly all firms have some degree of potential monopsony power. Some do not 
exercise it because in panel (d) they know it will harm employee morale and result in lower 
productivity and in panel (e) doing so will undermine a win-win employment relationship 
(Bronfenbrenner 1956); others selectively exercise it as (say) salary compression for long-service 
but immobile employees, while others – often among the employers following a low-road HRM 
strategy or in firms were production is not much affected by positive employee feelings – use 
their monopsony power to practice labor exploitation in a number of ways ranging from low 
wages to work intensification to abuse of civil liberties and human rights (Shulman 2003). 
The ubiquity of monospony (because labor markets are always and everywhere 
imperfect) also calls into doubt the logical coherence of yet another key component of SL&EM – 
the neoclassical labor demand curve. Standard price theory shows that an imperfectly 
competitive firm in the product market does not have a well-defined supply curve; for similar 
reasons firms in imperfectly competitive labor markets do not have well-defined labor demand 
curves (Fleischer and Kniesner 1980). Thus, the DS diagram and the standard labor demand 
curve diagram (e.g., Posner’s Figure 1.1) – the two most important theoretical constructs that 
SL&EM uses to make inferences about labor law – are both logically defective and need to be 
replaced by an alternative model. The IEIR solution is depicted in panels (a) and (b); that is, to 
replace the labor demand curve line with a labor demand curve band. The band idea illustrates 
absence of a one-to-one correspondence between the wage rate and quantity demanded of labor 
(as with a conventional NE labor demand line) yet allows for an inverse relation for relatively 
large wage changes. Thus, a modest and phased-in increase in the minimum wage may have no 
negative employment effect -- it may even be positive (Card and Krueger 1995) -- while a large 
one-time increase is more likely to have a negative effect.  
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Not only do the DS curves change from lines to bands, their location also changes. This is 
represented in panel (a) where both bands are shifted down relative to the NE lines. The labor 
demand curve is shifted down (to the left) because in the macroeconomy pictured in panel (c) the 
economy typically suffers from insufficient aggregate demand; less demand for economy’s 
products, therefore, means a smaller derived demand for its labor. Likewise, the labor supply 
curve is shifted down (to the right) because the employer class (and associated property/power 
elites) use their dominant political influence to create an institutional infrastructure that in 
various ways puts workers in a weaker bargaining position, forcing them to offer their labor time 
at a lower wage. For example, in a laissez-faire labor market dominated by employer interests 
(perhaps facilitated by restrictive suffrage rights in the polity and the financial corruption of the 
legislative process), the state provides no unemployment insurance. This reduces workers’ hold-
out ability and forces them to lower their reservation wage to quickly get work, thus shifting the 
labor supply curve rightward (Fehr and Falk 2006). Similarly, employers use their power to get 
employment law written so it favors their bargaining power by creating an unequal relationship 
of “master and servant” with authority to terminate workers at-will (Deakin and Wilkinson 
2005). The macroeconomic overhang of unemployed workers also forces down workers’ 
reservations wages and induces them to provide more effort (Bowles and Boyer 1988).  
Yet another change in the DS model regards the shape of the labor supply curve near the 
reproduction level of wages. NE theory draws the labor supply curve forward-sloped throughout, 
implying that as wages fall workers substitute from market work to other now-cheaper activities, 
such as leisure, attending school, and raising children. The theory does not explain, however, 
where workers get the income for food, shelter and family care if they do not have a paycheck. 
This consideration becomes paramount as wages approach or go below the reproduction (social 
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minima) level because without a modern welfare state and social safety net programs to provide 
non-labor income the average worker is in a “work or starve” situation and has no choice but to 
get work at any price. Hence, the labor supply curve at low wages is kinked and develops a 
negative sloped (forward-falling) segment with considerable elasticity (not depicted in Figure 2 
to avoid cluttering the diagrams), showing that as the wage goes below the subsistence level 
workers and family members increase offered labor supply in order to collectively bring home a 
survival income level (Sharif 2000; Dessing 2002). It is probable that in this region the labor 
supply curve becomes more elastic than the labor demand curve (target income behavior leads to 
a unit elastic labor supply curve); therefore, as wages are bid down by cutthroat competition 
among desperate workers the DS imbalance only worsens and the market becomes dynamically 
unstable – as in a depression situation. Also deleterious, the nation’s human resources start to 
deteriorate as labor income no longer fully covers minimum social cost (Prasch 2005). 
NE and the SL&EM portray the labor market and employment relationship as a level 
playing field where DS sets efficient and fair wages and workers cannot be exploited because 
they can quite one job for another. IEIR claims, however, that they get to this conclusion only by 
unduly ignoring the governance structure that embeds the operation of DS in labor markets. The 
reality, according to IEIR, is that the governance structure – absent countervailing social 
reengineering -- is tilted in favor of employers and workers do not enter the DS arena with the 
same rights, endowments and market position as the employers. Employers are frequently 
corporations and thus a “collective capital” with ownership over large, valuable and long-lived 
assets and a workforce of perhaps hundreds or thousands; workers, on the other hand, bargain as 
individuals, cannot diversify their risks and dependency beyond one job (or, perhaps, two), 
typically have few fall-back assets, and have only one commodity to sell and are under 
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considerable pressure to find a buyer (first, because each day’s labor has zero value if not sold; 
second, because the worker faces a minimum daily income requirement for family survival). 
Likewise, the entire structure of the law and property rights regime tilts bargaining power in 
favor of employers while in most years workers’ bargaining power is further undercut because 
the labor market has an excess of unemployed job seekers relative to companies with job 
vacancies (Webb and Webb 1897; Craypo 1997; Kaufman 2003, 2007a).  
The result, as pictured panel (a) of Figure 2, is that workers as a class are put in a 
disadvantaged and dependent position in wage determination, such as in an early capitalist 
laissez-faire labor market. Not surprisingly, therefore, the entire structure of wages, work 
conditions, and treatment of workers is lower than the NE theory is wont to portray. Particularly 
important is that the entire structure of compensating wage differentials is shifted down so that 
the wage penalty employers face for unsafe conditions, work intensification, and unfair treatment 
are smaller and therefore less protective. Also reducing employers’ incentive to adequately 
protect and conserve labor is that, unlike their buildings and capital equipment, employees are 
rented by the hour and thus firms lose less from labor spoilage than capital spoilage (Kaufman 
2010b). The labor market is also less “free” than portrayed since the choice for many workers, 
given mobility constraints, boils down to “work at a low wage dissatisfying job at Company A or 
quit and get the same kind of job at Company B” (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003).  
Indeed, the imbalance between wages and profit, and lifestyles of employers and 
workers, may be so starkly different that one cannot help but conclude the latter are exploited. In 
the NE “level playing field” world, the economic surplus is typically portrayed as relatively 
evenly divided between profit income and wage income and, hence, the market outcomes look 
fair and square (i.e., the DS lines are drawn so they intersect somewhere in the middle of the 
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diagram, such as Figure 1). In the IEIR world of structural inequality, however, a 
disproportionate share of the economy’s surplus – absent redistributive taxes and transfers -- 
goes to a relatively small group of people in the upper strata of the income and wealth 
distribution. Definitions of what constitutes exploitation differ (see Taylor 1979; Roemer 1982; 
Hahnel 2006), at a general level, however, IEIR contends that most people would agree with this 
proposition: some degree of income inequality between capital and labor is acceptable and 
legitimate (reflecting a differential reward to entrepreneurship, risk-taking, saving, etc.); as 
inequality increases at some point the distribution of income crosses over into “unfair” (or 
“unreasonable”) and if allowed to increase even further it crosses over into exploitation. 
Consider, for example, if the DS curves intersect in panel (a) on the dashed line so labor gets 
only a reproduction level of income and capital gets the entire surplus. Since this is still a 
competitive outcome NE declares it free of exploitation; IEIR, however, declares it exploitative 
because the bulk of workers get only enough of their product to survive so they can return each 
day to the nation’s factories, mills and stores to create and pass on to the upper class of property 
owners, employers and politically-connected consumers the rest of the GDP.  
A central purpose of FL&EM is to change endowments and rules of the game so the 
governance structure is more egalitarian, accessible, and democratic, thus yielding more 
balanced and reasonable terms and conditions of employment in the labor market and 
distribution of income in society. In terms of panel (a), the object of FL&EM is to reengineer and 
rebalance the governance structure so the DS bands shift upward to the position of the pencil-
thin lines and yield a wage and conditions of employment that would have existed if the original 
playing field had not been so tipped. This illustrates Adam’s (1887) idea of “raising the plane of 
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competitive action” and the institutional contention, illustrated in the earlier quote by Craypo 
(1997), that society and not economic law decides the labor outcomes yielded in labor markets.  
Raising the plane of competition can be achieved through a variety of means, many of 
which also correct market failures. Minimum wages and collective bargaining, for example, set a 
wage floor in the labor market closer to the pencil-thin DS lines (and offset monopsony power); 
unemployment insurance and old age pensions allow workers to have a higher reservation wage 
(and help cover labor’s social overhead costs), and government training and manpower 
development programs give workers more valuable skills and greater bargaining power (and 
correct for the free market’s undersupply of training due to companies’ free riding behavior). 
Since all such labor programs redistribute power and income from employers and the affluent 
(who, as consumers, benefit most from low-priced goods), they inevitably arouse considerable 
political opposition from these groups. Part of the IEIR program for a “balanced capitalism,” 
therefore, is to ensure that the parties with the most money (corporations, the affluent) are not 
allowed to buy the governance system that promotes their private interests; likewise, it is 
important that suffrage rights in the polity are widespread and equally protected. The 
presumption is that elected officials are more likely to put in place a balanced governance 
system, including employment laws and regulations and protection of collective bargaining 
rights, when they face a broader, more representative, and equally financed constituent base.  
From a conservative point of view these types of labor laws and social welfare programs 
look like collectivist wealth redistribution, confiscation of private property, and unwise 
interference in competitive markets; from an IEIR perspective without them capitalism and 
democratic society are threatened by excessive extremes of wealth and privilege and the 
economic instability and social conflict they produce. Similarly, SL&EM sees labor law as 
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(mostly) an anti-competitive form of protectionism while FL&EM sees the same “protectionism” 
as a social virtue that guards workers against oppressive and unfair terms and conditions of 
employment made possible by imperfect labor markets, a tipped institutional playing field, and 
an excess supply of job seekers.  
Now transition attention to panel (e). Pictured are four alternative employment relation 
outcomes: win-win; win-lose; lose-win; and lose-lose. NE and SL&EM assume the invisible 
hand guides employers and employees to adopt (approximately) efficient contracts where the 
joint surplus is maximized. Further, in a competitive market economy factor inputs receive a 
return proportional to their marginal value contribution to production; in the case of labor this 
means the wage rate paid workers is equal to the part of the output they help produce (the 
marginal product). Definitions of fairness differ and economists are reluctant to make judgments 
on this matter; nonetheless, many believe competitive outcomes pass the ethical test because 
labor receives it share of the fruits of production (called by Budd (2004) “marginal productivity 
justice”) and suffers no exploitation at the hands of employers. Since the size of the economic 
pie is as large as possible and distributed in what seems like an ethically satisfactory manner, one 
may judge that employers and employees are in the cell of panel (e) marked win-win. Here is 
another virtue of a competitive private-ordered economy and, presumably, another reason why 
trade unions and protective labor law are not needed in most situations. 
 From an IEIR perspective these conclusions are very inaccurate because they neglect the 
fundamentally human nature of labor. If labor was an inanimate commodity, it would have no 
consciousness of fairness and justice and, hence, no objection to alternative and perhaps quite 
unequal allocations. Labor is a unique factor input, however, because it is embodied in human 
beings (Edwards 2003; Kaufman 2010a). Accordingly, the structural inequality built into 
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capitalism, and the resulting asymmetric outcomes, inevitably leads workers to regard the state-
of-nature situation as unfair and unjust. This structural inequality is manifest at the market level 
in terms of the distributive process just reviewed. It is also manifest inside the workplace where 
employers and their hired managers (the “suits”) have high salaries, secure jobs, interesting 
work, social status, and power to issue and enforce orders while the rank and file of employees 
(with blue and pink collars) experience the opposite on all these dimensions.  
A common finding in laboratory experiments is that in an “ultimatum game” the party put 
into a highly unequal take it or leave it position refuses to accept the minimalist pay-off because 
it violates the standard of fairness (Miller 1991; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). IEIR predicts 
the same for the employment relationship. That is, because of the large asymmetry in both 
market level and workplace outcomes workers come to view the deeper reality of the 
employment relationship not as win-win but win-lose. So viewed, workers naturally pull back on 
cooperation, commitment, and hard work; in panel (c), therefore, the same labor input of L1 
yields less labor power. Employers, in turn, experience lower productivity and profit as labor 
power falls and come to see workers as uncooperative and lazy; they react, therefore, with a 
harsher attitude, tighter regime of workplace controls, and more punitive sanctions. This process 
creates a dynamic toward polarized positions where the two sides regard each other as 
adversaries embedded in a zero-sum game (Edwards 2003).   
From an IEIR perspective, the nature of the capitalist employment relationship makes the 
base-line outcome in panel (e) the win-lose option. In all companies the ER features elements of 
both cooperation and conflict and to various degrees this translates into a win-lose (or lose-win) 
payoff; some companies, however, are able through forward-looking management, progressive 
HRM and an accommodative economic environment to restructure the ER into a win-win. The 
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modern-day exemplar is variously known as the mutual gains enterprise, high involvement 
workplace, and high performance work system (HPWS) (Kochan and Osterman 1994; 
Applebaum, Berg, Kalleberg, and Bailey 2000). Empirical research finds that these transformed 
work systems have distinctly higher productivity and financial performance (Combs, Liu, Hall 
and Ketchen 2006), suggesting they outperform the win-lose or zero-sum type of ER. Yet 
research also finds that they represent a distinct minority of all workplaces (Blasi and Kruse 
2006). This seems to suggest that for some reason in the labor markets of real life that 
competition is not moving employers to capture available gains from trade by creating HPWS 
systems. 
The IEIR model points to a particular reason why HPWS firms are relatively rare. That 
is, their performance edge hinges on achieving a win-win ER but this outcome is unstable and 
difficult to maintain. The explanation goes back to panel (c) where shifts in the aggregate 
demand curve create boom and bust cycles. A mutual gain outcome requires that both capital and 
labor reap the benefits of cooperation, workers have secure jobs in return for loyalty and hard 
work, and employers live up to their promises – particularly when the going gets tough 
(Thompson 2003). However, employers are often forced (or say they are forced) by pressures of 
cost-cutting and short-term survival to renege on their commitments and institute actions, such as 
large lay-offs, wage and benefit cuts, and harsher discipline. These actions appear to workers to 
one-sidedly advance the interests of profit-making and shareholders over the interests of 
employees; they also seem to break the “we are partners” psychological contract (Edwards 
2009). If these actions by employers seem particularly harsh, unequal, and opportunistic, workers 
may react through strikes, sabotage, union organizing, and street protests. Thus, win/win 
deteriorates to win/lose as a general case but may deteriorate further to lose/lose.  
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IEIR depicts involuntary unemployment as a crucial feature and weakness of capitalism. 
It is a crucial feature because it gives employers a cheap but effective device to motivate and 
discipline labor (Edwards 1979; Bowles and Boyer 1988). A logically contradictory part of the 
NE model is the firm’s perfectly elastic labor supply curve (not shown). The curve indicates that 
workers can at no cost quit one employer and immediately find another job at the same wage 
with a different company; the contradiction is that the workers have no incentive to provide more 
than a minimum of labor power and, hence competitive equilibrium is not efficient. The problem 
is that this part of the NE model ignores the wage-effort bargain in panel (d). One device to 
extract labor power is for the firm as part of its HRM strategy to pay a higher than market wage, 
as theorized in mainstream efficiency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Akerlof 1990). 
Doing so increases labor power but if numerous firms do this it also raises the wage above the 
market-clearing level and creates a permanent reserve army of the unemployed. One may follow 
NE, cast this model in an optimization framework, and conclude that this kind of unemployment 
is not a “labor problem” because it creates the largest joint surplus (Boyer and Smith 2001); from 
an IEIR perspective, however, this is a labor problem because the structure of capitalism is 
dysfunctional in the sense it requires perhaps several million people to go without jobs so their 
plight motivates those who have jobs to work hard and obey the rules.  
A principle of IEIR, as pointed out earlier, is that labor markets are divided into segments 
with partially attenuated mobility across them (Kerr 1977). A major purpose of anti-
discrimination legislation has been to reduce these barriers and the structural inequality they give 
rise to. The most popular NE theory of discrimination claims, for example, that free market 
forces will automatically erode discriminatory employment practices arising from employers’ 
bigotry or prejudice (Becker 1957). This theory has difficulty, however, explaining why in the 
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free market and mostly non-union era before the New Deal stark and pervasive discrimination 
existed in wages, occupations, promotion and training (Leonard 2003). Also difficult to explain 
purely on efficiency grounds is why professional schools in law, medicine and business into the 
1970s so clearly discriminated in their admission policies on the basis of race, gender and 
religion (Epstein 1981). A popular NE theory attributes the small number of female doctors and 
lawyers in this era to the fact they voluntarily decided to not go to professional schools so they 
could better accommodate work and family (Polachek 1981). As in all matters discussed in this 
chapter, this NE theory has insight and explanatory power; the problem, however, is that it also 
neglects that part of the “voluntary choice” made by these women is based on opportunity costs, 
relative market prices, and preferences that are distorted by the tipped, discriminatory, and 
patriarchal nature of the governance structure within which DS are embedded (Albelda 1997; 
Gottfried 2006). From an NE perspective, civil rights and anti-discrimination laws are suspect 
because they interfere with demand, supply and free markets and, besides, free market forces 
eventually solve most of the problem; from an IEIR perspective, however, these laws are 
necessary so demand, supply and free markets are open to everyone and all workers are on a 
reasonably balanced playing field.   
The labor market segmentation arising from discrimination is amplified by other forms of 
segmentation in the economy’s institutional infrastructure. The efficiency wage idea discussed 
above, for example, explains the existence of a dual labor market economy with high wage firms 
and well developed ILMs in a primary labor market and low wage firms with highly externalized 
and insecure jobs in a secondary labor market (Bulow and Summers 1986). The factor that 
differentiates the two is the technology of production and the structure of the labor process. That 
is, if the technology entails jobs with considerable firm-specific skill, autonomy and effort 
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discretion then firms create ILMs and use high wages to elicit effort; if the jobs are unskilled, 
easily learned and can be tightly controlled then the firms pay low wages and extract labor power 
through tight supervision, fast-paced assembly lines, and so on (Edwards 1979). Thus, 
discrimination causes differential access to the good jobs in the labor market and then the “rich 
get richer” over time as favored workers move up job/career ladders in ILMs and primary firms 
while disfavored workers stall-out in dead-end occupations or jobs with short advancement 
opportunities in secondary firms.  
From an IEIR perspective, the most serious market defect and cause of labor problems in 
capitalist economies is widespread unemployment (Commons 1934; Kaufman 1997, 2003a). NE 
typically omits this consideration since it starts evaluation of labor law with the assumption that 
labor markets are in equilibrium (where the DS curves cross) and the only unemployment, 
therefore, is frictional and short-term in nature related to job search and geographic mobility 
(both good for the economy). In the half century before World War II, however, labor markets in 
all but a few years had millions of excess job seekers and a situation of D< S (Lescohier 1919; 
Long 1958). The excess labor supply was not remedied by flexible wages nor was it caused by 
impediments such as minimum wage laws or unions (widespread only after the mid-1930s); 
rather, the economy suffered from a general situation of demand-deficient unemployment. In 
tandem with structural sources of inequality, pervasive excess supply of labor considerably 
worsened many of the labor problems of that era by undercutting workers’ power to bargain for 
reasonable wages and conditions; short-circuiting the protective force of competition, and giving 
employers the upper-hand to manage employees in an autocratic and oppressive manner.  
 
IX. IEIR: From the 1930s to Today 
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We are now seven decades from the mass unemployment of the Great Depression era and 
the many labor problems it created that helped open the door to a growing body of labor and 
employment law. Conservative/neoliberal critics of IEIR say that in hindsight the New Deal was 
a huge mistake, labor and employment law has since then expanded to the point it makes 
American firms non-competitive in the global economy, and what America really needs to 
generate more jobs is a substantial roll-back of costly and inflexible labor law, collective 
bargaining and government entitlement (social safety net) programs. In closing this chapter, we 
need to briefly consider the merits of this argument.  
IEIR, as indicated above, considers unemployment to be the most serious defect of 
capitalism and greatest cause of labor problems. From an IEIR perspective, therefore, the 
economist who probably made the greatest contribution in the 20th century to improved 
employment relations was Englishman J.M. Keynes. Like IEIR economists, Keynes believed the 
“assume a competitive labor market” theory does not work in real life and, therefore, the 
Invisible hand of competition needs to be stabilized, regulated and balanced by the Visible Hand 
of government. Not coincidentally, Keynes advanced these then-heretical ideas in the middle 
point of the Great Depression, most notably in his famous book The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936).  
IEIR and Keynesian macroeconomics have close intellectual ties, in part because Keynes’ 
wrote the General Theory with ideas from earlier works by Commons and other American 
institutional economists (Whalen 2008; Kates 2010). In other writings, Keynes also endorsed the 
New Deal labor program of the Roosevelt administration, including minimum wages, expanded 
collective bargaining, and social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and social 
security (Moggridge 1982, Vol. 21: 438).  The central message of both IEIR and Keynesian 
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macroeconomics (KM) is that a laissez-faire economy is prone to serious boom and bust cycles 
and government needs to offset this instability by using fiscal and monetary policies in the 
macro-economy to keep aggregate demand at a steady full-employment level, supplemented with 
complementary stabilizing and redistributive programs in the labor market to maintain steady 
wage growth among working class and middle class households.  
In the last three-four decades neoclassical economics and social philosophy of 
neoliberalism have grown considerably in appeal and the IEIR/KM viewpoint has 
correspondingly lost a significant share of academic and popular support. One sign of this 
retrogression is the sustained criticism neoclassical macro-economists have directed against the 
Keynesian model; another sign is the substantial displacement of IEIR in mainline labor 
economics by neoclassical-oriented theory (Boyer and Smith 2001; Kaufman 2010a). The attack 
on IEIR/KM originally and most influentially came from economists at Chicago, such as 
Friedman, Stigler, and Lucas, but now is taken up by a wide range of conservative-leaning 
economists.   
A remarkable part of the neoclassical/neoliberal resurgence is their reinterpretation of the 
Great Depression, for many years taken as convincing evidence in favor of the IEIR/KM 
“imperfect capitalism” thesis. This reinterpretation began with Friedman at Chicago (Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963) but has recently found support among other notable economists, such as 
Nobel-laureate Edward Prescott (1999). They have collectively done what an earlier generation 
of economists would have thought impossible; that is, they have reversed the (apparent) lesson of 
the Great Depression with the claim that the length and severity of the debacle was not the fault 
of free market capitalism but was instead caused by labor law, unions, unwise government 
macroeconomic intervention, and government-supported market rigidities. Thus, from their point 
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of view it is highly ironic for IEIR/KM to use the Great Depression as justification for “more 
government” when it was precisely government and allies (unions, etc.) that started the downturn 
and then transformed it into a decade-long depression.  
Regarding labor markets and labor law, for example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2003) 
claim, “These poor [labor] policies turn what otherwise would be modest downturns into 
prolonged depressions” (p. 3); in a similar vein Ohanian (2009) concludes “the key to 
understanding the Depression is understanding and quantifying this labor market distortion” (p. 
2314). These economists arrive at these conclusion using “assume a competitive labor market” 
reasoning. That is, involuntary unemployment means the price of labor is too high and therefore 
D<S; the evident solution to unemployment is to reduce wage rates until labor is cheap enough 
that employers hire all who want to work. The New Deal labor program, however, (allegedly) 
thwarted the labor market’s self-correcting process by preventing wages from falling; in fact, it 
made the depression worse because minimum wages, social security, expanded collective 
bargaining and the other parts raised the price of labor and thus further reduced employment.   
This argument has increasingly gained traction among economists is now influential and 
widely-cited (e.g., Parker 2007). But a closer examination reveals serious problems with it. 
One has to appreciate in evaluating the free market argument that in the first half of the 
Great Depression both unions and labor law were a very small presence. The nation did not even 
have a federal child labor law when the depression started in 1929 (it came in 1938, along with a 
minimum wage) and, likewise, union density was about ten percent and nearly all of the mass 
production part of the economy was essentially union-free. It is true that after Franklin Roosevelt 
became president in early 1933 legislation (National Industrial Recovery Act) was enacted that 
encouraged an expansion of unions and minimum wages, but this can have nothing to do with 
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the collapse of the economy into depression. Indeed, money wage rates were relatively flexible 
and declined by over one-quarter between 1929 and 1933; also of note, Roosevelt strongly 
resisted greater government deficit spending in his first term in office.  
So, given this context, how were free labor markets operating in the early 1930s? Were 
they promoting efficiency and fairness and helping the economy get back to full employment? It 
helps to start the IEIR rebuttal with these two quotations from case studies of employment 
conditions during the 1930s. This type of case study evidence is an important way 
institutionalists try to confront theory with facts. The first come from a study of auto workers 
(Peterson 1987: 133): 
“Foremen met workers’ complaints about worsening working conditions with the 
perennial request to look out the window at the line of job seekers and the standard 
refrain of, ‘if you cannot do the job, there is somebody in that line who can.’ Many plants 
combined speed-up with a shift from piecework to day rates, keeping wages low as 
production increased at a rate that one study estimated from two to three times its 
predepression rate. Some workers were even forced to work overtime for no pay in order 
to keep their jobs.” 
 
The second quotation comes from a study of San Francisco dockworkers (Nelson 1988: 
106-07): 
In San Francisco, the Embarcadero was known as the ‘slave market,’ but to many who 
witnessed it the shape-up bespoke of an even lower form of existence…. One 
longshoreman recalled that ‘for thirty-five days, rain or shine, I was out there, on the 
waterfront from five in the morning till all the crews were filled, but I never got a job.’ Of 
course, the shape-up system invited abuse, ranging from petty corruption to systematic 
extortion… where the men regularly kicked back 10 percent of their wages to the gang 
boss.”  
 
Here from an IEIR perspective is the dark-side of a free labor market system that 
SL&EM proponents tend to ignore or rationalize away. The IEIR perspective is quite different 
because employment outcomes such as described in these quotations are not treated as anomalies 
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or the fault of government and unions, but, rather, a predictable outcome of laissez-faire 
capitalism.  
In IEIR and KM theory, the one-quarter drop in money wages and one-third drop in 
prices from 1929 to 1933 unleashes a deflationary process of “destructive competition” or “race 
to the bottom” that is potentially quite destabilizing (Kaufman 1997; 2007b). The idea that 
competition can turn destructive and should therefore be restricted is antithetical to NE and 
SM&LE theory; likewise, a fall in wages and prices according to competitive DS theory is 
desirable as a way to bring the economy back to a full employment equilibrium.  
In IEIR theory, however, competition can turn destructive in a recession or depression for 
several reasons. Strong competition, for example, brings on wage cuts but wage cuts reduce 
aggregate demand in panel (c) of Figure 2 and drives the economy deeper into recession and 
unemployment. Also, wage cuts can become destabilizing because, as earlier described, labor 
supply expands when wage cuts reduce family income toward the survival level (the kinked 
labor supply curve idea). Competition can also be destructive when it reduces wage rates and 
family income below the social minima in panel (a) since workers’ physical and human capital 
begins to deteriorate. A situation of falling wages and prices also increases the real debt burden 
of firms and they react by cutting costs wherever possible. Since labor is typically the largest part 
of variable cost in the short-run, the brunt of cost reduction falls on workers in the form of lay-
offs, speed-ups, deteriorating working conditions, and harsher treatment. The labor market and 
competition provide them little protection, however, because compensating wage differentials 
are compressed or eliminated and many hungry jobseekers are available to employers. A final 
negative effect of strong competition in this situation is that the ratcheting down of wages and 
conditions of employment leads to feelings of unfairness, insecurity and bitterness among the 
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employees, all of which undermine cooperative and high-productivity win-win employment 
relationships in panel (e).  
Frances Perkins, Labor Secretary in the Roosevelt administration, summed-up the IEIR 
perspective when she said (quoted in Craypo 1997: 226): 
“As a nation, we are recognizing that programs long thought of as merely labor welfare, 
such as shorter hours, higher wages, and a voice in terms and conditions of work, are 
really essential economic factors for recovery and for the technique of industrial 
management in a mass production age.”    
 
This was the 1930s; what about today? FL&EM and IEIR see great progress since the 
New Deal along the three major fronts of attack on labor problems: ameliorating labor market 
failures, balancing the institutional governance structure, and reducing unemployment. President 
Reagan famously asserted that the nine most feared words in the English language are “I’m from 
the government and I’m here to help you.” IEIR asks, however, that we look below the surface of 
appealing free market rhetoric and consider the record of what has been accomplished by 
government in labor markets. Consider, for example, a list of the major labor and employment 
laws enacted since World War II. A short list includes: Equal Pay Act, Civil Rights Act, Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, Employee Retirement and Security Act, Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Americans 
with Disabilities Act, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
The respective opinion on these laws of the American public and NE/SL&EM 
economists is noticeably discordant. Hamermesh (2009) reports that the most researched labor 
policy issue in labor economics is the minimum wage. According to a 2006 national poll 
(reported at http://pew research.org/pubs/18/maximum-support-for-raising-the-minimum), 83 
percent of Americans said they favored a $2.00 increase in the minimum wage; economists 
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Neumark and Washer, however, reflect a large body of economic opinion when they conclude in 
their new book Minimum Wages (2008), “we find it very difficult to see a good economic 
rationale for continuing to seek a higher minimum wage.” The belief of most IEIR economists is 
that the public has the correct position not only on the minimum wage but all of the other labor 
laws cited above. This does not mean these laws are perfect or cannot be improved; it does mean, 
however, that IEIR believes the public accurately perceives that these laws helped solve 
significant labor problems. Evidence in support of this belief is taken from the fact that political 
efforts in the USA to repeal old labor laws (e.g., the move to privatize social security in the Bush 
administration) and block several new laws (e.g., President Obama’s health care law) have 
failed.  
Nonetheless, clearly the political tide in the last three decades has on balance favored 
giving a greater role to markets and paring back government regulation and collective 
bargaining. In this respect SL&EM has clearly dominated FL&EM. The decision of the state of 
Wisconsin in early 2011 to rescind collective bargaining rights for public sector employees is 
emblematic, as is the near-death experience of Obama’s health care legislation. An IEIR 
interpretation is the following, with emphasis on two themes articulated in the quote from 
Commons (earlier featured) – the inevitability of contradictions in labor policy and the need to 
look at labor law as one part of a larger industrial relations system.    
Here Keynes re-enters the story. After World War II the American government gradually 
started to practice Keynesian-inspired full-employment fiscal and monetary policies. The effect 
was dramatic – recessions were shallower and further apart, economic growth was fast-paced 
into the early 1970s, and the labor market stayed closer to full employment. If the economy is at 
or near full employment, then the NE “assume a competitive labor market” theory comes a step 
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closer to reality and its implications for labor law and unions have more relevance. In particular, 
in a full employment economy workers do not need as much labor law protection, unions 
gradually transition from a protector of the underdog to a source of monopoly wages, and both 
laws and unions begin to appear to people as unnecessarily restrictive and cost-increasing. The 
apparent success of Keynesian full employment macroeconomic practices, therefore, undercut 
some of the need for the wage-raising and protective parts of the New Deal labor program. This 
was most true concerning protection and support of trade unions since new labor laws are mostly 
a one-time structural change in DS in labor markets but collective bargaining has a built-in 
dynamic push for “more” that in a full employment economy creates a growing problem of 
monopoly wages and benefits and cost-push inflation pressures (Mitchell 1980; Kaufman 
2007c).  
Union density in the private sector gradually declined over the years until in 2010 it was 
less than 8 percent (Hirsch and Macpherson 2011). This decline was partly an automatic 
economic response as higher-cost unionized firms gradually lost market and employment share 
to non-union competitors and foreign firms; partly it was also a product of an effort by the 
Reagan and Bush administrations to weaken unions through a variety of regulatory rulings, shifts 
in labor law enforcement, and budget reallocations (actions also applied to other areas of labor 
law, such as occupational safety and health). Here emerge contradictory forces, however.  
On one hand, the decline of private sector unions, selective weakening of existing labor 
laws, growth of flexible work arrangements (e.g., contract and temporary employment), and 
process of globalization succeeded in creating a more competitive labor market since the early 
1980s, exactly as NE and SL&EM have advocated. The accompanying outcomes, however, were 
exactly what IEIR theory would predict – reemergence of an inequality of bargaining power for 
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the middle-to-lower part of the workforce and growing structural inequality in the nation’s 
governance structure and institutional rules governing the labor market. Inequality of bargaining 
power reemerged because workers lacked a viable union threat effect, American workers were 
now competing with low-wage workers in China, India and other countries, and lack of good 
jobs in America put workers into more of a “take it or leave it” situation. The governance 
structure also gradually tipped in favor of the interests of employers and the affluent due to 
growing political and financial clout by conservative and pro-business groups, declining clout by 
unions and other groups on the progressive/left side of the political spectrum, and a growing 
flood of money into political lobbying and elections.  
These two structural shifts created a more competitive labor market, but “competitive” in 
this case is manifest not by removal of government restraints and movement to the DS 
equilibrium (Figure 1) but a shifting down of the DS curves (Figure 2 panel (a) from the pencil-
thin lines to the bands) and the entire plane of competition in the American labor market. Two 
important examples are decisions of the American government since 2000 to live with large-
scale illegal immigration and an undervalued Chinese currency, both of which in effect expand 
the supply of labor competing against American workers and increase profits relative to wages 
(if labor demand curves are inelastic, which evidence (Hamermesh (1993) suggests they are). 
Accordingly, real wages and family incomes stagnated for the middle and working classes, most 
of the productivity gains generated by the economy went to corporate profits and top-tier earners, 
and the income distribution gradually moved to greater inequality in favor of the rich (Economic 
Policy Institute 2011).  
The rising income share for employers, property owners, and affluent creates buoyant 
financial markets, construction spending, and capital goods spending, all of which expand the 
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supply side of the economy. The downside, however, is that a stagnant-to-modestly rising real 
wage and a falling income share for labor leads to anemic growth in household income, 
consumer spending, and aggregate demand – propped up for a time, perhaps, by a run-up in 
household debt. Eventually a structural shortfall of demand develops that price adjustments 
cannot solve, precipitating a sustained bout of overproduction (output Q1 in Figure 2 panel (c) 
but demand of Q2), large rise in unemployment, popping of real estate and financial market 
bubbles, and in a worst-case scenario descent into economic crisis.  
These events, from an IEIR perspective, describe the economic crisis of 2007-2010. They 
are also eerily reminiscent of the economic crisis of the 1930s. As in the 1930s, more unions and 
redistributive labor laws are blunt and often costly measures to solve the problem of structural 
imbalance and economic inequality that afflicts the American labor market of the early 2010s. If 
these tools are not used, however, then society needs to come up with some other mechanism 
that preserves a reasonable balance in bargaining power and income distribution. What IEIR and 
FL&EM are absolutely certain of is that a strategy of deregulation, deunionization, and wage-
cutting for solving American competitive problems will only worsen matters.  
Free market theories of the “assume a competitive labor market” type are intellectual 
works of beauty and have insights not to be ignored; nonetheless, they are also a recipe for labor 
problems and economic mal-performance because they envision labor markets as operating no 
differently than commodity and financial markets. If the field of industrial relations has a central 
theme, it is that this doctrine is dangerously inaccurate in theory and harmful in practice. 
 
X. Conclusion 
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From one point of view labor markets are highly competitive, employment practices are (mostly) 
efficient adaptations to underlying costs and constraints, and government solutions are typically 
inefficient and coercive. This point of view, most closely identified in the post-World War II 
period with the neoclassical economics and second L&E tradition at the University of Chicago, 
leads to the conclusion that in most cases labor law and employment regulation should be kept to 
a minimum and used only when evidence of market failure is clear and compelling and other 
pro-market solutions are infeasible.  
From another point of view -- most closely identified with the institutional 
economics/industrial relations and first L&E tradition born in the early part of the twentieth 
century at the University of Wisconsin – external and internal labor markets are considerably 
imperfect and structurally unbalanced and, hence, wages, conditions and managerial employment 
practices tend to have significant elements of inefficiency, injustice and inhumanity. Further, 
from this point of view even if labor markets could be made highly competitive it is undesirable 
to do so since they are harmful to cooperative high productivity employment relations and the 
life interest of workers in jobs with reasonable security, stability and advancement opportunities.  
So viewed, capitalism and the work world can be materially improved by a complementary 
program of labor law, social insurance, availability of collective bargaining, and macroeconomic 
guidance that together deploy the visible hand of government to supplement, strengthen and in 
some cases restrain the invisible hand of self-interest and competition.  
 It is generally the case in employment disputes, as arbitrators, mediators and judges come 
to learn full-well, that neither side to an argument has a monopoly on facts and truth. Hence, the 
verdict has to be established by a careful and objective weighing of the evidence. In this chapter I 
have endeavored to present to the jury both the positive case for the IEIR/FL&EM side of the 
78 
 
labor law debate and a critical account (albeit hopefully fair and balanced) of the gaps and 
shortcomings in the NE/SL&EM argument. Without question labor law, labor unions, and social 
safety net programs entail costs and sometimes cause economic inefficiency; the IEIR position, 
however, is that the “assume a competitive labor market” proposition that grounds the 
NE/SL&EM evaluation of these institutions is biased because it accentuates their costs and 
minimizes their benefits. In effect, the “anti” side of the labor law debate asks the jury to 
evaluate labor law with a theoretical framework that inevitably leads to a base-line verdict of 
“guilty until proven innocent.” It does this by committing what Demsetz (1969) calls the 
“nirvana fallacy;” that is, evaluating imperfect human-made institutions against the outcomes of 
a (mostly) first-best set of markets and contracts. The essence of IEIR is to model labor markets 
and employment relationships in a more realistic and hence imperfect manner, with the effect of 
opening intellectual space for labor law and labor institutions to do good as well as harm. IEIR 
proponents have considerable faith, in turn, that if American social policy were to actually follow 
the deregulation regime explicit or implicit in SML&E – for example, the list of 
recommendations/conclusions cited earlier from Posner’s Law and Economics -- the nation 
would soon see a return of all the labor problems that FL&EM worked so hard over the twentieth 
century to solve.  
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Figure 1: Competitive Labor Market  
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Figure 2: IEIR Model of Labor Markets 
And Employment Relationship 
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